Former ambassador to Malta Saad Elshlmani tells Mark Micallef Libya’s transitional government has good reason to want Muammar Gaddafi’s former intelligence chief in captivity. He can unlock so many of the regime’s secrets.

Saad Elshlmani never came across as a Gaddafi man. Moderate and straight talking, he managed to build a reputation among Maltese politicians as a level-headed operator who could be truly trusted, even when he was forced to front the regime’s erratic stands.

Photo: Matthew Mirabelli

We suspected Gaddafi was exploiting the migration situation

It is only now, however, that he can speak freely of his long-held dislike of Muammar Gaddafi.

Like many young Benghazi students of his generation, he took part in the student protests of the 1970s, which provoked one of the most repressive reactions in the regime’s 42-year history. Hundreds of young protesters were arrested, many were tortured and some executed in high profile, sometimes televised hangings, which succeeded in terrorising large swathes of the Libyan population into submission for decades.

Unlike two other students in his group, who were hanged publicly in 1977, Dr Elshlmani ‘got away’ with spending a few weeks in detention in 1976 – during which he came face to face with the feared Abdallah al-Senussi, Libya’s former intelligence chief and Col Gaddafi’s right hand man, who was recently captured in Mauritania.

Libya has demanded 62-year-old al-Senussi be sent to Libya rather than the International Criminal Court, defying some international observers who argue the fledgling state already has too much on its plate to be dealing with such high profile and potentially divisive trials.

But Dr Elshlmani, now the spokesman for the transitional government’s Foreign Ministry, argues that the people making these statements may not be fully appreciating Libya’s position.

“Abdallah al-Senussi, perhaps even more than Saif, holds the key to so many of the regime’s secrets that it is vital for us to be able to speak to him. There are many stories of people who were killed or disappeared mysteriously on whom, probably, only al-Senussi can shed light at this point.”

He was Gaddafi’s conduit, Dr Eshlmani says, pointing out that the dictator would never give out orders directly but would always go through his intelligence chief. If Libya had any involvement in the Lockerbie bombing, for instance, al-Senussi would know, he points out.

Dr Elshlmani should know a thing or two about Lockerbie. In 2003 he formed part of a secret think tank which helped broker the historic deal with the US that prompted the lifting of sanctions on Libya.

The 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 was perhaps the biggest hot potato in those talks, but Dr Elshlmani says he knows little more than the next person with a good grasp of the facts surrounding the tragedy.

“When I was Ambassador to Malta we had assisted the lawyers of (Abdelbasset) Al Megrahi as they prepared for the appeal. They were very confident that with new evidence they had in hand, particularly surrounding the testimony of the Maltese witness Tony Gauci, Al Megrahi’s conviction would be overturned. But I cannot say for certain if Gaddafi was involved or not. The person able to do that is al-Senussi.”

Despite the Maltese authorities’ insistence that the bomb never left from Luqa airport, the courts still decided to convict Mr Al Megrahi.

Without resorting to torture, Dr Elshlmani insists, the Libyans would be able to extract from Mr al-Senussi this information and other missing links in some of the darker happenings of the past 42 years

“It’s about asking the right questions. If I speak to al-Senussi about certain events in the 1970s, for instance, I would be able to extract information from him because he would not be able to lie to me... I would be able to take him back to the day we met and remind him what he told me,” he says. “The ICC would simply not be able to do this.”

For outsiders, it is hard to reconcile the contradiction of having someone who was so personally affected by the regime actually end up working for it but Dr Elshlmani is in many ways typical of how many Libyans had to adapt and it goes to explain why Col Gaddafi was hit by such a tsunami of resistance once the tide had turned.

“For a very long time, there was simply no alternative to the government, not just for work but for everything,” Dr Elshlmani points out. When in Malta, he found himself having to reconcile this contradiction when fronting the regime’s double-faced stand on illegal immigration. At the height of the problem between 2005 and 2007, the Maltese government had even for a period escalated its tone with the Libyans, implying that Col Gaddafi could do something about the matter if he wanted to.

Dr Elshlmani had the same feeling but could not express it. “We suspected he was exploiting the situation but we only had suspicions because we were fed the official government line,” he says.

Diplomatic staff did not have access to the facts on the ground to be in a position to establish with certainty that the regime was encouraging or even sponsoring illegal immigration.

“Today, we know this was the case, because there has been a drop. On the other hand, the problem was clearly not all made up – otherwise it would have all but disappeared after Gaddafi’s overthrow. And it hasn’t.”

Now that Europe’s attention seems to have eased off Libya, he warns that his country needs help more than ever to deal with mundane problems such as irregular immigration, especially at this fragile juncture.

In recent weeks, deadly clashes have taken place in the southern outpost town of Kufra, which has long been a main node in the route used by criminals smuggling migrants into Libya from Chad.

Reports suggest smugglers are taking advantage of the weak hold on security of Libya’s transitional government to ensure they can continue with their actives unhindered. Local authorities there said the situation had become unmanageable.

“The truth is Libya today needs the same sort of assistance we used to ask for during Gaddafi’s time. It’s going to be very difficult for the transitional government to manage without help. We need technical assistance and equipment... money can help but it’s not the main priority. We need European countries to help.”

Before the revolution, the EU had started a structured debate on the subject with the view of creating a long-term solution that tackled the problem within the Libyan territory.

The progress was scuppered from time to time by Col Gaddafi’s outlandish claims.

“Yes, it has stalled somewhat. It’s not like before. When there is a delegation the subject is broached but there seems to be no structured mechanism to deal with this... European countries will find a partner, a real partner which really wants to do something to deal with the issue.”

The situation, which admittedly is not one of the more pressing for Libya itself, is tied, with what should have been the new government’s top priority – disarming the population.

Dr Elshlmani reacts with characteristic optimism when the security situation is put to him.

“We knew this would be a difficult task right from the start. It’s not easy to turn back from a situation where almost everyone has a gun. But in time the great majority of these people, I don’t like to call them militias, will realise that laying down their weapons is the only way forward.”

Unlike many analysts, who say plans for July polls should be put off until the security problem is resolved, Dr Elshlmani believes elections are part of the solution.

“Many of these people are honest but they are reluctant to give up arms until they are certain the revolution is safe. We already have the experience of some elections in cities like Misurata, for instance, which were very successful. Everyone in Misurata has a gun but the elections were held in a healthy competitive environment.”

The NTC is doing its best to stick to the end of June deadline. There might be delays but a month or two “doesn’t matter” at this stage, he says.