This time two years ago, Italy had just finished runners-up in the European Championship following a 4-0 upset to the all-conquering Spain at Kiev’s Olympic Stadium, in Ukraine.
A third place finish in the 2013 Confederations Cup further underlined the progress the Azzurri had made following the appointment of Cesare Prandelli who filled the void left by Marcello Lippi at the end of the 2010 World Cup.
In autumn last year, Italy joined The Netherlands as the first European teams to secure qualification for the 2014 World Cup.
But, Prandelli’s men failed to sparkle in the build-up to the Brazilian showpiece as they went into the finals on a run of seven matches without a win.
That scepticism was somehow erased as Italy kicked off their World Cup campaign with a hard-fought 2-1 win over England in the Group D opener.
Prandelli was immediately elevated to a hero status and many were of the opinion that Italy could make inroads in the tournament.
However, that success over Roy Hodgson’s mediocre team was the prelude to Prandelli’s self-destruction and Italy’s demise.
The dream of reaching the first knock-out stages was cut short following identical 1-0 defeats to dark horses Costa Rica and Uruguay.
Italy finished third in the group and for the first time since 1966, they were knocked out at the group stages of two consecutive World Cup editions.
The victory over England in Manaus was expected to lift Italy but a series of mistakes followed.
Against Costa Rica, the Azzurri never got going and did not deserve anything better than a defeat.
Then, needing only a draw from their final group fixture against Uruguay to progress, Italy opted for cautious tactics.
Such defensive attitudes are not typical of Prandelli. Eventually, Diego Godin’s goal nine minutes from time punished Italy for an indifferent approach to the game.
To make matters worse, Prandelli’s changes left the side without an out-and-out striker on the field, reducing the chances of goals in no small measure.
In Brazil, Prandelli erred in his selections.
In Italy’s first two games, the ex-Fiorentina mentor deployed Mario Balotelli as a lone striker with Antonio Candreva in a supporting role.
Whereas the 4-1-3-1-1 playing system was effective against England, the same cannot be said against Costa Rica as this time Italy failed to create any scoring chances.
Against the Ticos, Prandelli opted to drop Salvatore Sirigu, Gabriel Paletta and Marco Verratti and instead deploy Gianluigi Buffon, Ignazio Abate and Thiago Motta. Buffon did well but Motta, who replaced Verratti, never got going.
Against Uruguay, Prandelli changed Italy’s playing module altogether, opting for a 3-5-2 set-up with Balotelli and Torino’s Serie A top-scorer Ciro Immobile in attack.
When quizzed about the possibility of deploying the two goal-getters together in a pre-World Cup friendly, Prandelli had openly confessed his scepticism at this eventuality.
Another important factor behind the early exit from the World Cup was an internal rift in the Azzurri dressing room
So, it is still a mystery why he decided to deploy an untried and untested striking partnership in the country’s most crucial World Cup group qualifier.
Could be that Prandelli conceded to the pressure exerted by the media to give Immobile some playing time in Brazil.
The result was a poor showing in attack. Balotelli was substituted midway through the game and Immobile was replaced by a colourless Antonio Cassano 19 minutes from time.
Before the World Cup, Prandelli had given the impression that he had a clear idea of who to play and in which positions.
Reality proved otherwise though as his changes undid most of the good work the team had done in the past four years.
Another important factor behind the early exit from the World Cup was an internal rift that existed in the Azzurri dressing room.
It emerged that Cassano and Balotelli were considered as outcasts by the old guard.
Reports said that Prandelli had fallen out with the senior players, including goalkeeper and captain Buffon, Andrea Pirlo and Daniele De Rossi after the coach selected Cassano at the expense of Giuseppe Rossi in his final 23-man list for Brazil.
Prandelli, like Fabio Capello (at the helm of Russia) and Alberto Zaccheroni (Japan), had a poor 2014 World Cup.
Combined, none of these three Italian coaches managed to progress past the group stages, winning just one game from nine.
It is ironic that the three highest paid coaches at the World Cup – Capello, Hodgson and Prandelli – all experienced the same fate and the humiliation of returning home earlier than anticipated.
Prandelli’s mission to make Italy a true force to reckon with in the World Cup eventually turned out to be the vision of doom.
The rest is history.