Even as President Barack Obama authorised air strikes in Iraq, there were high-ranking US military officers expressing doubts about whether they would have anything other than a short-term effect on the disciplined, well-armed fighters of the Islamic State (Isis), which occupies a third of Syria and a quarter of Iraq.
The air strikes were ostensibly ordered to protect US personnel.
It’s expected, however, that they will also provide cover for Kurdish troops, the peshmerga.
The theory is that the latter will offer the first real fierce resistance to the Islamist terror organisation, which is 100 times larger and more capable than its parent, al-Qaeda.
Not everyone is as hopeful. Some veteran observers believe that the military successes of Isis have generated a dynamic of recruitment and resources that make it independent, now, of international backers.
It also has a dynamic that transcends the Levant in which it was born. Isis has connections with Libya, especially certain militias in the east. Success by the anti-Isis forces in Syria and Iraq would turn out to be a mixed blessing – if it led to Isis fighters returning to Libya in large numbers.
The reciprocal connection between Libya and a wider jihadist front is an old one. It goes back at least to 1912, when a Syrian-born preacher, Izzuddin al-Qassam, urged his audience to join the stream of Levantine fighters sailing to Libya to defend the last Ottoman stronghold in North Africa against the infidel invader.
Al-Qassam and the group he gathered round him never made it to Libya. They literally missed the last boat, after which the Ottoman authorities decided to shift the focus of anti-European resistance to the Balkans.
Al-Qassam remained in the Levant, organising resistance to the British and Zionism in Palestine. He died in a shootout in 1935 but the manner of his dying transformed him into, first, a nationalist hero and, later, an Islamist one.
He showed a path of grassroots armed resistance, linked to social work, which contrasted with that of the Palestinian elite politicians, who favoured compromise with the British. Today, the military wing of Hamas is called the al-Qassam Brigade.
The al-Qassam story shows how long-lasting and wide-ranging the consequences of armed struggle can be.
We don’t need to go back 100 years, though.
The godfathers of many Islamist terrorist groups in the Arab world today received their first training in the 1980s in Afghanistan while fighting against the then Soviet Union and receiving support from, among others, the West and the Gulf monarchies.
In the 1990s, many returned to their country of origin and began to organise terror attacks there. Libya was one of the countries they returned to. After the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the US and the UK, a new generation of fighters acquired experience in fighting for al-Qaeda there.
Many left from Libya, too. Not in great numbers but it’s probably not an exaggeration to say that everyone knows of a family that has had junior members suddenly disappear, with it being assumed that they went to Iraq. In eastern Libya, recruitment was so high, per capita, that the city of Derna was once dubbed, by Hillary Clinton, as the al-Qaeda recruitment capital of the world.
In Syria and Iraq today, Isis is the child of al-Qaeda that has greatly outgrown its parent and turned against it. Its rapid growth and hostility to al-Qaeda go hand in hand, since the leaders of Isis refused the instructions to limit themselves to Iraq.
In overrunning vast tracts of Syria and Iraq – getting to within an hour’s drive from Baghdad last month – Isis has found that success breeds success.
Many of Iraq’s oil resources have fallen under its control. In Iraq, it has formed tactical alliances with various groupings – tribal, Baathist and Sunni – that might otherwise have reason to fear it. In Syria, rebel fighters have been abandoning their original groups to join it; partly, no doubt, because of hopes for better training and equipment, as well as for the spoils of victory.
Some analysts consider these alliances to be superficial and the growth to be difficult to manage. Hence, the hope that Isis will eventually succumb to overstretch, intra-sectarian fighting (common enough already), its own corruption (of which there is plenty of anecdotal evidence) and, not least, real resistance from Shia and Kurdish fighters who know they can expect no mercy if they lose.
The lessons from Iraq include obvious mistakes that, perhaps, might still be avoided in Libya
The pessimists see another story unfold. Last month, Shiite fighters volunteered in large numbers to assist the national army to battle Isis.
Many have returned home since, however, complaining of being under-equipped and needing to pay for their own ammunition – tales that, in Iraq, would be automatically assumed to be an indictment of the corruption of the central government, which paid for expensive equipment that never arrived.
Furthermore, Isis has displayed far better military strategy than its Islamist rivals. It has forgone flashy targets for a steadier build-up. It has shown the capacity to fight on more than one front.
If the battle for Syria swings away from Bashar al-Assad, it will be because Isis will force him into multi-front battles involving ground troops, when his own troops are thin on the ground.
This capacity for fighting battles on several fronts, together with access to important resources, may give Isis an additional reason to transfer troops to Libya, besides any possible setback in the Levant.
The Libyan east, with its oilfields and Isis sympathisers already on the ground, would be an important platform.
Furthermore, the battle for the east is already heating up. The former general, Khalifa Haftar, has sworn to eradicate all Islamists from the east, making no distinction between those prepared to be part of the political process and those who are Isis affiliates. His militia has already bombarded Islamist strongholds.
This strategy of escalation might end up provoking the very opposite of what it aims for: the east might end up swarming with heavily-armed Islamists, with a ready pool of new recruits who see no point in remaining with the Muslim Brotherhood.
Many of these possibilities lie outside the control of any single country, including the US. Nonetheless, the lessons from Iraq include obvious mistakes that, perhaps, might still be avoided in Libya.
Various of Syria’s and Iraq’s neighbours have been complicit in the early build-up of Isis. The West could have brought more pressure against the corruption of Nuri al-Maliki’s government. It has long known that, unless political reconciliation between the various factions was sought, with an equitable Constitution and division of oil proceeds, no amount of military effort would quell the violence.
Whether a new Iraqi government can save its country from falling into the hands of a fearsome terrorist organisation remains to be seen. Hopefully, we are still well in time for Libya.
ranierfsadni@europe.com