In the current stand-off over migration, it’s easy to think that, politically, we are faced with a stark choice. Either we support the strategy of Robert Abela’s government or else the claims of the NGOs insisting on search-and-rescue. Either we find fault with one or with the other. But this is a false choice.
The dynamics of migration from Libya have changed in recent years. Malta has a lot to protest about with justification – not least about the irresponsible behaviour of some NGO rescue ships. The government, however, has reacted badly, not just on ethical and human rights grounds, but on long-term strategic ones, too.
It’s not easy to formulate a Maltese strategy on migration. Financial aid packages for Libya or development aid for Africa are either futile or very long-term. Waffle about generic diplomatic lobbying is useless. We must grasp the concrete constraints of other EU member states.
The migration dynamics are completely different from what they were 11 years ago, when Malta flirted with supporting Berlusconi’s Italy’s interceptions on high seas. There are four major differences.
Then, Libya had an effective if untrustworthy leader, Muammar Gaddafi, you could negotiate with. Now, the recognised government does not have effective state powers.
Then, our fellow non-Mediterranean EU states didn’t quite appreciate the difference between a land frontier and a maritime one. At a land frontier, you can control influx, keep people waiting while you process their papers, turn them away if they are obviously economic migrants.
At sea, that is dangerous. People need to be brought into your territory first. The numbers can be so huge, proportionately, that they can overwhelm the administrative apparatus. Even the best planning can be undone if a ship sails in, without warning, with a few hundred migrants.
It took a long time for member states to appreciate this difference. Hence why for a long time their insistence was on the legal obligations concerning the disembarking of migrants, an insistence that is far more muted today.
Third, the composition of irregular migrants to the EU has shifted. The Syrian war has produced many migrants with the right to humanitarian protection. Even so, the proportion of all such migrants to the EU (from all directions) has fallen to circa 25 per cent. A few years ago, a sizeable majority of migrants deserved humanitarian protection.
That shift in composition is reflected in the migrants arriving in Malta. The result is that we get entangled in a law written for different times. Future EU agreements for relocating migrants qualifying for legal protection.
Returning them to their home countries remains the responsibility of the EU state they entered. It’s a protracted, difficult task. Only some 30 per cent of economic migrants are successfully returned.
In a context where some 75 per cent of irregular immigrants in Europe are economic migrants, you can understand why member states are reluctant to accept the responsibility of returning them to their home countries.
NGOs are effectively hijacking the migration policymaking of sovereign states- Ranier Fsadni
If the ‘refoulement’ law has been rendered anachronistic by the changes in migrant composition, the search-and-rescue (SAR) law has been severely tested by the new presence of NGO rescue ships.
The obligations of SAR were written for a context where it was assumed that SAR was necessitated by an accident or tragedy at sea. Ten years ago, virtually all migrants brought to Malta were rescued from near death. Those still in seaworthy boats were nudged in the direction of Italy (as was their legal right, by the way, since that’s where they usually wished to go).
The NGO boats have changed this. Some circumstantial evidence (though there’s no court-grade proof) points to collusion with traffickers. The NGOs have an uncanny sense of where they need to pick the migrants. It’s unlikely that they destroy the smugglers’ boats – as Frontex would do – after the migrants are picked up.
If this is really what’s happening, it’s a crime. There’s a law against facilitating human trafficking. It’s collusion not just with one-off smuggling but with an entire industry. (That is not to say the NGOs are a 'pull factor', which does not seem to be the case.)
The rescue ships may have morally golden intentions. Indeed, they are supported by a range of noble-hearted organisations back in their European countries – from left-wing charitable organisations to churches. This broad, domestic, civil society support is what makes it complicated, electorally, for governments to investigate them. But the golden intentions still make the actions irresponsible on humanitarian grounds. The NGOs are effectively hijacking the migration policymaking of sovereign states.
This background reveals the objective difficulties for any workable Maltese strategy against being overwhelmed by migrant arrivals, while living up to our humanitarian obligations. But it also shows the contours of what the most promising strategy is.
The sponsors of rescue ships – especially churches – need to hear the moral and factual case for not colluding with traffickers. The case for changing European laws needs to be made. The direction of French and German efforts for EU solidarity needs to be retained.
Malta’s current strongman behaviour undermines all that. To make the moral case, we must occupy the moral high ground. To change the laws, we mustn’t suggest that the current laws can be played with (while exposing yourself to successful human rights actions). We must act in ways that retain French and German sympathies, rather than get them to refocus on our violations.
Other states are giving us a pass during this pandemic. That’s not going to last. Persisting with the current tactics – the improvisation hardly qualifies as strategy – is going to be counterproductive in the longer term.
ranierfsadni@europe.com