Brexit at 10: the cost of a political illusion

Ten years after the Brexit referendum, the verdict is no longer ideological; it is empirical. Brexit was sold to the British public as a route to sovereignty, prosperity and renewed national control. In practice, it has imposed a terrible economic and social cost on the United Kingdom, weakened its influence in Europe and forced London into the deeply uncomfortable position of trying to rebuild, piece by piece, a closer relationship with the very Union it chose to leave.

What is now increasingly clear is that Brexit did not deliver the economic liberation its advocates promised. On the contrary, the evidence points in one direction: lower growth, weaker investment, reduced productivity and more friction in trade with the UK’s largest and most important market.

A decade of data shows that Brexit has reduced UK GDP by between 6% and 8%, with investment down by 12% to 18% and employment and productivity both lower by 3% to 4% than they would otherwise have been.

A study by the Centre for European Reform shows that Brexit has reduced total UK exports to the EU by about 12% and total imports from the EU by about 16%. Trade is an important driver of productivity and these losses reduce UK national income by curbing export sales, making imports scarcer and easing the competitive pressure that drives productivity growth.

These are not marginal effects. They amount to a serious self-inflicted wound on the British economy. The argument that Brexit would unleash a more dynamic, globally competitive ‘Global Britain’ has clearly not stood up to scrutiny. New trade deals with third countries have either not materialised or not compensated for the reduced ease of access to the EU single market, while exporters, particularly smaller firms, have had to absorb new customs formalities, regulatory barriers and compliance costs.

Evidence from the London School of Economics shows that the Trade and Cooperation Agreement reduced exports to the EU by around 30% for small firms, with many ceasing to export goods to the EU altogether.

Brexit did not produce one dramatic collapse. Instead, it acted as a slow-burning constraint on growth: deterring investment, raising transaction costs and steadily eroding competitiveness. This gradual decline had made it easier for the political advocates of Brexit to deny the demise in the early years but now, 10 years on, the evidence is unequivocal.

This is why the present British government appears, in practice, to be acknowledging what it may still hesitate to say in full: Brexit has caused serious harm to the UK and the national interest now requires a closer, more structured relationship with the European Union. The EU–UK summit and the subsequent Security and Defence Partnership were not signs of confidence in splendid isolation; they were signs of strategic necessity.

What is increasingly clear is that Brexit did not deliver the economic liberation its advocates promised- Stefano Mallia

The renewed efforts to ease food and agricultural checks, deepen regulatory cooperation and institutionalise closer defence ties all point to the same reality – the UK is seeking to reduce the damage of the distance it created. In other words, after years of political theatre about “taking back control”, London is negotiating its way back towards the EU because geography, economics and security have not changed.

A decade on, another part of the Brexit story has become impossible to ignore: many of the loudest prophets of Brexit have either faded from view (Boris Johnson anyone), retreated from frontline politics, or fallen silent about the promises they once made with such certainty. The extravagant claims – easier trade, stronger growth, restored influence, frictionless sovereignty (Jacob Rees-Mogg is still trying to deny he ever promised such things) – have not survived contact with reality.

What remains is a gap between rhetoric and outcome and a country that was persuaded by political mythmakers to weaken its own economic foundations.

Never have so few people caused so much harm to a country. This is a political lesson as much as an economic one. The cost of irresponsible leadership is eventually paid by citizens, firms and future generations.

The only one still on the front line is Nigel Farag who incredibly tries to maintain some form of credibility where none should exist.

For Malta, the lessons are especially relevant. As a small, open and fully committed EU member state, Malta should see in Brexit a cautionary tale about the false comforts of nationalist illusion. Sovereignty today is not measured by how far one stands apart but by how effectively one shapes decisions with others.

The UK left the room where the rules were made, only to discover that those rules still mattered profoundly to its economy and security. Malta, by contrast, gains leverage precisely by being inside the Union – at the table, in the negotiation and part of a market and political bloc far larger than itself.

Ten years later, the central lesson is stark. Brexit was not an act of strategic renewal. It was an exercise in national self-harm dressed up as a brave new beginning. The UK is now, quietly but unmistakably, trying to move closer again to the European Union because the promises of Brexit proved hollow and the costs proved real.

Malta should take careful note. In an age of insecurity, fragmentation and geopolitical competition, our strength lies not in retreat from Europe but in serious, confident and constructive engagement within it.

Stefano Mallia is a former president of the European Employers Group in the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and is currently vice president of the Transatlantic Committee of the EESC.