Coalitions, history and STV
Joseph M. Pirotta's response Coalition Governments (August 23) elicits some interesting questions about coalitions, the single transferable vote (STV) and the interpretation of historical events. If, as Prof. Pirotta states, it is the case that in 1950...
Joseph M. Pirotta's response Coalition Governments (August 23) elicits some interesting questions about coalitions, the single transferable vote (STV) and the interpretation of historical events.
If, as Prof. Pirotta states, it is the case that in 1950 the MLP led by Dom Mintoff reneged on a coalition agreement, then I clearly stand corrected on the details of Enrico Mizzi's attempts to form a coalition. (It would be enlightening to have Mr Mintoff's comments/views on this episode.)
George Borg Olivier's formation of a coalition government in early 1951 perhaps requires clarification. The point I would draw here is that a coalition was created and gave some political stability by governing for two years. It is well-documented that Dr Borg Olivier did not favour Britain's political offerings at the time.
The events surrounding the fall of this government are indisputable but as Professor Lane points out (The Sunday Times, August 21) "one might want to delve into the particular circumstances of the time". The intentions of Dr Borg Olivier are open to interpretation and discussion on the historical level. A canny and shrewd political mind as Dr Borg Olivier's cannot be quantified on the basis of the pure mechanics of parliamentary procedure.
Did Dr Borg Olivier allow the collapse of his government, did he have ulterior motives, as has been suggested by other historical commentators? I understand the professor's reluctance to move beyond the narrow historical facts. Prof. Pirotta does, however, corroborate my contention that Malta's relations with Britain were at the time at the top of the political agenda and it is in that field that the politicians acted in the 1950s.
I finally wish to take up Prof. Pirotta on his assertion that the Maltese electorate has consistently rejected the opportunity of multi-party parliamentary representation from 1966 onwards. The 1966 election results present an intriguing case. The Christian Workers' Party polled over 8,000 votes (six per cent of the national valid vote). It however received no parliamentary representation. How does this reconcile with Prof. Pirotta's statement that two-party parliamentary representation is "not due to the electorate not having numerous opportunities to widen its representation"?
The disproportionality of the STV must be of concern in an open debate on electoral voting systems and coalitions. In the Maltese political experience, the statistical norm has been for the STV to favour the larger parties at the expense of the smaller parties (the 1966 results are but one example). The argument that coalitions always produce political instability, as several of The Times correspondents contend, is not a sustainable one. Even STV can spectacularly undermine governability as in 1981 when only two parties contested the elections. Prof. Lane's observations provide a concise explanation as to the merits or otherwise of coalitions.
Electoral reform in Malta is long overdue. It has been more than 10 years since the need for revision to our voting system was recognised by the Buhagiar Report (1994). The report offered a process that "is fair to all parties whether large or small; in particular a party which obtains many votes nationwide but still fails to win a seat (hence it) can obtain representation in Parliament by this method". Of the three political parties at this time, Alternattiva Demokratika campaigns for the change that is sorely needed. Those who oppose electoral reform ultimately oppose the enhancement of the democratic process.