Death from the Nile

Robert Abela has attracted criticism for his stand on Malta’s defence expenditure and the Ukraine conflict. His critics say he’s being careless with Malta’s security. He’s a free-rider, exploiting our fellow Europeans’ benevolence, and Putin’s puppet. Is that so?

Not really. If you ignore his hypocrisy (speaking one way in Brussels, another in Malta), he’s not going out on a limb.

He says more arms will not help Ukraine win the war, openly contradicting many fellow European politicians. But in agreement are the military analysts who have most accurately predicted events over the last two years. It’s hardly an isolated or pro-Russian position.

He’s also said he will not increase the defence budget at the expense of socio-economic transfers and investment. Nor will he borrow money. Again, hardly alone.

The European Commission has made it possible for some cohesion funds (meant to reduce socio-economic disparities) to be diverted to defence.

States like Lithuania and Poland, bordering Russia, have indicated they might make use of this facility.

However, Spain’s socialist government, like the European Socialists generally, has broadly hinted it would not. Italy’s right-wing government has ruled it out. Giorgia Meloni adds that Italy’s fiscal position makes it imprudent to borrow money to spend on defence.

These views are not necessarily short-term or anti-European. If cuts in social spending lead to unrest, the result could be the ultimate irony: an anti-Putin defence policy that angers voters into choosing a populist government that’s more sympathetic to Russia.

We’re left with the matter of our national security. Is Abela being cavalier? Is he reneging on Malta’s duty of constructive cooperation?

We can’t answer such questions with vague scenarios of doom.

If we’re afraid of conquest by Islamic terrorists or a Russian invasion from a base in Libya, we need to explain how this might work.

Putin has his hands full. Russia has a new 1,340km border with NATO, now that Finland has joined the organisation. China is making incursions into Siberia.

Malta would be a distraction. And why would the US Sixth Fleet tolerate a challenge to its dominance in the Mediterranean?

As for other scenarios, we need to be more concrete to see our wide range of security needs and what investment they require.

Libya remains unstable and Tunisia’s president is driving his country into deeper crisis. If all-out conflict breaks out in either country, one of the high risks would be an environmental disaster (such as oil spillage that ruins our coastline) or danger to civilian aircraft.

Here, investment in Malta’s security need not be military. The biggest threat is economic. We might do better with the development of expertise in environmental protection, conflict prevention and crisis response.

The Mediterranean is full of contested claims over the delimitation of exclusive economic zones- Ranier Fsadni

What about an outright Islamist conquest? More plausible is another scenario: that Malta becomes the Vienna of the Mediterranean. That is, Vienna in 1914, whose neutrality made it a hotbed of intrigue in the run-up to WWI.

Islamist terrorists are likely to find an insecure Malta more useful as a centre of clandestine trafficking – moving people into mainland Europe by stealth and smuggling arms and drugs in an unholy alliance with organised crime.

They would prefer Malta to retain the semblance of security and peace. However, the stakes would be high enough that we risk losing control – through bribery and blackmail – over our government.

Here, the right mix of defence spending would include investment in our intelligence gathering and cooperation with foreign counterparts. We are not neutral on terrorism and cross-border crime.

The fixation with territorial conquest means that, in our national discussion, we hardly pay attention to maritime grabs. The Mediterranean is full of contested claims over the delimitation of exclusive economic zones. The contestations are legal but we cannot rule out a breakdown in the rule of maritime law, stemming from a crisis in a belligerent non-EU state.

Here, investment must include good alliances and a reputation for living up to our own maritime obligations. If we don’t take our legal obligations to our allies seriously, why should they pay more than lip service to our rights?

Perhaps the most plausible scenario is the destabilisation of Egypt within a decade. Donald Trump’s wish of a rapprochement with Russia includes cooperation over the Arctic Sea lanes that, if the ice caps melt, are likely to open up within 10 to 15 years. These sea lanes would be fatal to the Suez Canal, which would lose its shipping to the shorter, cheaper route.

The Egyptian economy would take a big hit. The crisis would quickly become political. If it’s uncontrollable, death will come from the Nile – moving towards the Levant, towards North Africa and, possibly, towards us.

Investing in security here would mean cooperating with other EU partners to implement a proportionate, well-funded development strategy for the Mediterranean and not let the border with Russia steal all the attention. But we’re unlikely to be a credible voice if we’re not also cooperating on other security issues in the region.

These scenarios are only thumbnail sketches. But they are enough to show that our choices are not binary.

The prime minister is right to say that borrowing money to buy arms is unwise, at least for Malta. But borrowing money to invest in defence is not necessarily the same thing as buying arms. Some investments have economic dimensions and spin-offs. And there are ways of making our neutrality work on behalf of European security.

But let’s not be glib about it. Let’s discuss the options in a grounded manner, without magical thinking, taking the long view and without hoping for a free lunch.