Disrupting Russia’s LNG shadow fleet

The recent drone strike on a sanctioned Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanker in the central Mediterranean has exposed vulnerabilities in Moscow’s fragile energy shipping network, threatening the small fleet it operates that carries Arctic gas to Asian markets.

The last recorded vessel tracking data of the LNG carrier Arctic Metagaz (IMO 9243148) was about 20 nautical miles off Malta, when it was sailing south-southeast at roughly 16 knots.  According to reports, hours later, the tanker was located and attacked, allegedly by surface maritime drones deployed by Ukraine’s Security Service in the early morning of March 2. The strike caused a fire onboard and left a large hole in the hull.

The Arctic Metagaz had departed Murmansk on February 24, then sailed around the United Kingdom and Spain into the Mediterranean, likely bound for the Suez Canal and onward to Asian markets. This vessel is part of a small group of ships used to transport cargo from Russia’s sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 project which, along with its supporting logistics network has been under EU, US and UK sanctions.

The strategic significance of the attack prompted Russia’s transport ministry to issue a statement via Interfax, claiming that the strike occurred “near Malta’s territorial waters and that it was carried out from Libya by Ukrainian unmanned boats”. The Maltese government, however, reported that the same incident occurred around 140 miles south of Malta.

Russia’s Arctic LNG exports rely on a limited number of carriers operating outside Western sanctions frameworks. It is estimated that only about a dozen vessels are available to service the network and the fleet is already stretched thin. Western restrictions on acquiring new ice-breaking LNG carriers have forced reliance on ageing ships and complex ship-to-ship transfers.

The loss of even a single tanker as happened a few days ago in the central Mediterranean can therefore have an outsized effect on Russia’s shadow fleet operations.

Early signs of disruption are already visible.  After the attack, another LNG vessel linked to the Arctic LNG network paused near Port Said after passing through the Suez Canal. The tanker had likely been returning to Arctic transfer hubs after delivering its cargo to China. Meanwhile, another vessel appears to have altered its route entirely, potentially bypassing the Mediterranean to reduce risk from other drone attacks.

Neutrality does not eliminate risk, prevent conflict spillover or deter technological threats- David Attard

Such diversions, including sailing around the Cape of Good Hope, would add thousands of nautical miles to each voyage, increasing fuel costs and travel time. Longer journeys also reduce the number of trips each vessel can complete annually, further limiting Russia’s Arctic LNG output. This in turn limits the revenue generated which is used to part finance the war in Ukraine.

The latest incident suggests that Russia’s shadow fleet, intended to bypass Western sanctions, now faces a new form of risk in the form of targeted attacks far beyond the Black Sea and the original conflict zone in Ukraine. This latest strike may also prompt a reassessment of maritime security for Russian energy shipping. For a fleet already constrained by sanctions and having limited capacity, even such a single attack can ripple across operations, forcing changes to routing, scheduling and cargo management.

The incident underscores that Russia’s shadow fleet, while crucial for circumventing sanctions, remains highly vulnerable to targeted operations, particularly in regions previously considered low-risk. The recent attack also raises broader questions closer to home about maritime security in the central Mediterranean as well as the security posture of Malta. The strike highlights the vulnerability of major shipping lanes in the central Mediterranean to long-range drone or unmanned vessel strikes.

Malta sits along one of the world’s busiest energy corridors, linking the Mediterranean to the Suez Canal. Such attacks on maritime shipping reinforce the need to invest further in our security, and closer cooperation with friendly countries could help monitor and deter unconventional maritime threats, including drone attacks, unmanned surface vessels or sabotage targeting critical shipping in nearby international waters.

The latest incident underscores that even neutral states in high-traffic maritime zones face significant strategic security challenges when conflicts spill into international shipping lanes.

Malta’s constitutional neutrality, while embraced by all sides of the political spectrum, is too often domestically interpreted as a kind of panacea that will shield us from every threat, real or perceived. The stark truth is far less comforting. Neutrality does not eliminate risk, prevent conflict spillover or deter technological threats. It simply defines our military alignment and places the responsibility for our security squarely on our shoulders.

Colonel David P. Attard is a former deputy commander of the Armed Forces of Malta and a graduate of the Joint Services, Advanced Command and Staff College, UK.