In publishing separate proposals on rule of law reforms, the two main political parties have diverged on some of the key issues.
Initially these reforms were being discussed within the context of the constitutional convention and one key aspect – the system of judicial appointments – was agreed unanimously in a parliamentary motion jointly presented by the prime minister and leader of the opposition two months ago.
The divergence now raises the risk of the usual partisan rivalry, which would make it harder to achieve consensus in parliament to enact constitutional amendments.
For the reform to be effective, ideally all of the reform has to be constitutionally entrenched, avoiding the situation of last June when the law on the State Advocate was voted in by a simple majority over the PN opposition. Ironically, some of the changes that were resisted last June have now been put on the table by the government a year later even if the main point of contention – the PM’s limited discretion in selecting the Attorney General and State Advocate – remains off the table.
The PN, in its latest proposals, is still calling for these two key appointments, as well as that of the police commissioner, to be made by two-thirds parliamentary majority.
In other respects, the PN’s proposals are more in tune with the spirit of recommendations of the Venice Commission. This includes its call to prohibit MPs from being engaged in state entities as directors or consultants, or members of boards.
This chimes with a proposal that was also made by Commissioner for Standards in Public Life, George Hyzler.
The PN then proposes MPs being given a choice of going full-time or remaining part-time. The thinking is that some might prefer to remain in their day-jobs partly because it gives them a chance to remain more active in the community as well as giving them insurance for life after parliament.
The PN’s proposal on actio popularis is similarly progressive: it would give any person or NGO a clearer legal route to challenge laws, as well as administrative decisions to a lesser extent, in the Constitutional Court. And so does the proposal to suspend much of the government’s powers once parliament is dissolved for election.
This proposal, if implemented, would spare the country from the usual pre-election-rush engagements in the civil service, carried out either for electoral reasons or to embed party figures in a government job before the party in government loses power.
The PN also propose a commissioner against corruption that would replace the current ineffective Permanent Commission Against Corruption, an entity that, in the government proposals, would only be superficially strengthened.
The sobering fact is that political corruption is not being investigated. And our country will not be able to make the next leap in its development and standard of living for as long as evident corruption continues to be swept under the carpet.
On the other big set-piece of reform, the system of judicial appointments, the PN has now aligned itself with the Venice Commission on having the appointments committee rank applicants after a call for applications for specific judicial vacancies. The government has also shifted to a lesser extent, and this bodes well for eventual consensus.
More widely, if the government truly seeks meaningful reform, it should bear in mind that warming up to good proposals – irrespective who makes them, even if it’s the electoral competitor – is a sign of strength and maturity, not weakness.