Editorial

It is almost 57 years since what the Israelis call the War of Independence and the Palestinians refer to as The Catastrophe brought about the birth of Israel. Three wars were fought since 1948. The first was launched by Israel against Egypt with the collusion of Britain and France when the Suez Canal was arbitrarily nationalised by Nasser in 1956. The second was the Six-Day War in 1967. One consequence of this was to extend Israel's original borders. The third war, was launched by Egypt and Syria during Yom Kippur, in 1973.

It was not until 1978 that Israel was recognised as a state by Egypt in a peace deal drawn up at Camp David, a recognition that arguably led to the assassination of Egyptian leader Anwar Saddat. Two substantial intifadas, in 1987 and in 2000, kept the Middle East region in a state of agitation. They were punctuated by the 1990 Gulf War and the second war against Iraq launched by the "coalition of the willing" in 2003.

Elections just held in Iraq and Palestine may provide the region with its first chance for a lasting peace to break out and for the entire region to come face to face with democratisation against many odds. In a bid to reduce those odds, the American Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice, embarked upon a Euro-Arab tour that saw her in London and Berlin, Warsaw and Ankara, Tel Aviv and Ramallah before visiting Italy, France, Belgium and Luxembourg and returning to the US. It was a grand Kissingerian sweep and showed Ms Rice to be no less impressive and articulate than the formidable Secretary of State who extricated America from the Vietnam war.

If the European element of her tour was aimed at fence-mending, her work last Sunday and yesterday was to persuade Ariel Sharon and Mahmoud Abbas to move forward from the narrow beachhead created by a dramatic de-escalation of violence between the two sides. Why should the meeting of these two leaders be any more successful or, rather, any less of a failure than on previous occasions whether in Egypt or Camp David?

There are five good reasons that come to mind.

The first is that Mr Abbas is not Yasser Arafat. Committed to a peace process that will not diminish Palestinian hopes, he has also taken steps to bring Hamas gunmen to heel. This has increased his prestige with the United States and as significantly with his Israeli counterpart.

The second reason follows seamlessly; if Mr Abbas can deliver, the Americans are in a better position to persuade Israel to make "hard decisions".

Third, in the wake of the Iraqi elections, America's commitment to the process that will nudge both sides back to the first grid reference of an almost forgotten road map is now firmer than it has ever been. Success in Israel/Palestine here will promote further success in Iraq and vice versa.

Fourth, generous aid for the improvement of security and for reconstruction is going to be monitored in a way that billions of dollars passed on to Mr Arafat's establishment was not. Then, rampant corruption diverted desperately needed funds from their intended use.

And, fifth, apart from a follow-up determination on the part of the US that was missing during George W. Bush's first presidency, Palestinian confidence in the US is high. The European Union, Russia and Arab governments, for the most part, are on board. There exists a strong belief that today at Sharm el-Sheik white doves will fly.