The three decades after World War II were the golden age of the mainstream centre-left and centre-right political parties in Europe. The centre-left attracted support from the massed ranks of working-class voters and middle-class progressives. The centre-right found support in the property-owning middle class and professionals.
Both mainstream parties abandoned their support for the hard-line ideologies of communism and fascism. They promoted a new political-economic order based on an understanding of the relationship between capitalism and democracy. This strategy was tempered and limited by a democratic state openly committed to protecting citizens from markets’ most destructive and destabilising consequences.
Today, the mass political movements that once dominated Europe are fading fast, with nationalist populists and new parties taking their place. Many political scientists argue that this trend is not a blip but is here to stay. In Europe and other democracies, politics has entered a dealignment age that is thriving on the decline of mainstream parties.
The reasons behind this decline are various, some attributable to local issues while others result from the way European society evolved in the last three decades. One key disrupter is the centre left’s shift from workers to a culturally liberal and university-educated middle class.
The centre-left up to the 1970s could rely on the disenfranchised and disadvantaged of the day. It was the political voice and champion of the underprivileged, mainly low-paid, low-educated manual workers. Those who supported the centre-left believed in their party’s ability to provide for them ‘from the cradle to the grave’.
The centre-right slowly lost touch with the realities being faced by their supporters as the globalisation revolution that began in the post-war era ushered a new era. Being middle class no longer meant immunity to financial insecurity. New and more potent issues like immigration, refugees, Islam, the declining power of the nation amid supranational integration, gender equality and challenges to the traditional family unit were insufficiently addressed by both the centre-right and the centre-left mainstream parties.
Populist parties are beginning to adopt more pragmatic strategies to appeal to a broader band of disillusioned voters
In 2009, just before the effects of the financial crisis began to be felt, 54 per cent of Europeans claimed that they did not feel close to any party. A MORI poll conducted last year found that 57 per cent of Britons felt that the old guard of “traditional parties and politicians” had abandoned them. The results in other European states were quite similar.
Up to the late 1970s, both the centre-left and the centre-right had impressive organisational capabilities – extensive grassroots networks, ties to civil society associations, committed activists and immense memberships. These formidable tools began to decline in the 1980s, hindering the ability to link citizens to governments, mobilise them for elections and other political activities and facilitate information flows from the grassroots to leaderships.
Political disengagement became more pronounced. Disillusionment with political institutions grew exponentially. The media, especially social media, provided information to citizens more effectively, often setting the political agenda.
During the late 20th century, centre-left parties generally abandoned their commitment to the post-war social democratic consensus and embraced the emerging new neoliberal one. This was probably partially caused by a shift in the nature of the centre-left party leadership towards a highly-educated elite whose preferences, particularly on issues like immigration and cultural change, diverged significantly from those of their traditional voters.
These changes created an opportunity for new parties on the extreme right and left of the political spectrum to exploit the opportunity. They convinced many disillusioned voters that traditional politicians did not care or even understand what ordinary people’s concerns were. The traditional centre-left parties were even more negatively affected by this haemorrhage of support than the centre-right.
This trend is unlikely to change. Populist parties are beginning to adopt more pragmatic strategies to appeal to a broader band of disillusioned voters.
At the same time, the leaders of distressed mainstream parties engage in an internecine battle to discover the best way to restore their former glorious golden age.
They quarrel about rebuilding winning electoral coalitions with moderates insisting on shifting to the centre while progressives are demanding more radical policies.
Successful political transformation will always depend on the three Ps – personalities, policies and passion. Unfortunately, many mainstream parties of the centre-right and centre-left show severe deficiencies in all three elements – weak leaders, policies that do not address the real concerns of ordinary people and politicians with an unquenchable desire to survive in the political arena at all costs.
This lethal combination makes it that much easier for Europe’s political orphans to support new political alliances.