On August 24, the Small Claims Tribunal (SCT) delivered its judgment on application 1/19 CZ. The facts of the matter are simple and of concern to most of us who occasionally leave Maltese shores. The case involved a flight from Malta International Airport, the departure of which was delayed for four hours. The operator concerned was Ryanair DAC, called upon as defendant. The flight was FR 5227 from Malta to Poznań in Poland on September 1, 2017.
The plaintiffs filed this action according to the Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 11, 2007, establishing a European Small Claims Procedure, which applies for claims whose value do not exceed €2,000.
Being an EU regulation, this has direct effect and application in the Maltese legal order. It is appropriate to point out that one has to consider which judicial organ is competent according to the nature of the claim and Maltese procedural law.
As explained in a separate judgment on application 12/2020 KCX, delivered by the SCT as presided by a different adjudicator, “in line with Art. 19 of Regulation (EC) no. 861/2007, subject to the provisions of this regulation, the European Small Claims Procedure shall be governed by the procedural law of the member state in which the procedure is conducted”. This signifies that the procedural rules and principles applicable to this case are those found under Maltese domestic law since Malta is “the member state in which the procedure is conducted”.
In the judgment under review there was no issue of competence, as the matter was a monetary claim of less than €2,000, which when considered in light of the provisions of Malta’s Small Claims Tribunal Act, chapter 380 of the Laws of Malta, falls within the competence of the said tribunal.
In actual fact, the competence of the SCT under Cap. 380 is for monetary claims up to €5,000, but regulation 861/2007 is limited to claims the value of which do not exceed €2,000. Combined with the fact that art. 56A of our Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure limits such cases to the SCT, the plaintiffs in this case were right in filing the case with the SCT. These points are of no small importance, as they could well spell the failure of a claim. In this case, the claim by the two plaintiffs was a monetary one of €400 each.
Due to the nature of the case, being delayed flights and the rights of passengers, the SCT also considered Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of February 11, 2004, establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No. 295/91 (Text with EEA relevance). Remedies to delayed flights are expressly provided under Article 6 of Regulation 261/2004, and the SCT determined that the relevant provision is specifically that of article 6(1)(b), given that the delay was for four hours and said provision refers to intra-EU flights of 1,500 kilometres or more.
The detriment suffered by passengers of delayed and cancelled flights are the same and both irreversible
Regulation 261/2004 also provides for remedies to be afforded to passengers and in this case the SCT explained that the legislative text of the same regulation refers to the remedies provided according to article 9(1)(a) and 9(2). In short, these remedies refer to the provision of reasonable food and drink for the period of the delay, and to two telephone calls, telex or fax messages or e-mails, free of charge.
The SCT rightly considered this problematic as the claim by the plaintiffs was for a compensation of €400 each. The referred provisions of Regulation 261/2004 would seem to preclude such a remedy. Indeed, the SCT rightly pointed that compensation as claimed by the plaintiffs does not seem applicable as the compensation in the legislative text is limited to the cancellation of flights and not to their delay. That is how the interplay of provisions in regulation 261/2004 seems to apply, as appropriately explained by the SCT. The SCT went on to state that this appears so at first glance.
This leads us to the consideration that law is not just the legislative text, but it also includes the jurisprudence produced by the relevant courts and, or judicial organs, as well as other sources of law. The SCT thus proceeded to consider the interpretation given by the Court of Justice of European Union (CJEU) in the cases ‘Christopher Sturgeon et v Condor Flugdiens GmbH (C-402/07)’ and ‘Stefan Böck et v Air France SA (C-432/07)’.
In these cases, the CJEU proceeded towards a teleological interpretation of the EU legislative instruments. The CJEU stated that as it “made clear in its case law, it is necessary, in interpreting a provision of community law, to consider not only its wording, but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see, inter alia, Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission [2000] ECR I-6857, paragraph 50, and Case C-306/05 SGAE [2006] ECR I-11519, paragraph 34)”.
In the case of a delayed flight, we thus have an absolute departure from the actual legislative text under regulation 261/2004, with the CJEU stating that the detriment suffered by passengers of delayed and cancelled flights are the same and both irreversible, and that there is no justifiable objective reason for any difference in treatment. In deference to the legislative text, the CJEU, and the SCT in this Maltese case, stated that Regulation 261/2004 does provide that this assimilation would not be applicable if the operator proves extraordinary circumstances, but in this case Ryanair DAC remained mute.
In light of the above, the SCT proceeded to accept the claims of the plaintiffs, and thus ordered Ryanair DAC to compensate them €400 each, with all costs of the proceedings against Ryanair DAC.
Edric Micallef Figallo is an associate at Azzopardi, Borg and Associates Advocates.