June 12, 1798: The Order of St John ceded the Maltese islands to a French invading force led by General Napoleon Bonaparte whose excuse for the attack was that he was refused water for his fleet and army. This was a blatant lie because the Order was simply adhering to the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht by which, at times of war, only four belligerent ships could be admitted within the harbour to take water. However, Bonaparte wanted the whole fleet to be allowed in. That this was just an excuse is amply proved by previous events indicating clearly that the French had had the conquest of Malta in mind for a number of months, probably years, previous to the invasion of June 1798.

A cursory look at a number of letters regarding Malta written in 1797 and 1798 unequivocally and clearly demonstrate that, when the French fleet appeared off Malta in June 1798, the firm intention was the occupation of the Maltese islands. In as early as May 1797, Bonaparte was already ruminating about the possibility of capturing Malta for France, with his line of thought amply demonstrated in a letter, dated May 24, that he addressed to the Executive Directory of France:

Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord (1754-1839), in a portrait by Pierre-Paul Prud’hon. Formerly a bishop, he was the French Minister for Foreign affairs with whom Napoleon corresponded about the necessity for capturing Malta. Photo: wikiwand.com

“The island of Malta is of particular interest to us. The Grand Master is dying; it appears that his successor is going to be a German. Five or six thousand francs are needed to make a Spanish Grand Master. Is it not possible to insinuate to the Prince of Peace to occupy himself with this matter which is of the utmost importance? Valletta has 37,000 inhabitants who are well-disposed to the French; there are no English in the Mediterranean; why should not our fleet or that of Spain, before sailing to the Atlantic, go to Valletta to seize it? The knights are not more than 500 in number and the Regiment of the Order has not more than 600 men. If we do not take such a measure, Malta will fall to Naples. That little island is invaluable to us.”

At that time, Spain was at war with Britain, and the Spanish francophile minister Manuel de Godoy (the ‘Prince of Peace’ in the letter) wielded great influence over his country’s policies. The dying Grand Master was a reference to the apoplectic Emanuel de Rohan Polduc, who actually died a few weeks later and was succeeded, as predicted in the letter, by a German (actually an Austrian from the German Langue), Ferdinand von Hompesch. Less than four months later, Bonaparte again exerted pressure on his government. On September 13, 1797, Bonaparte wrote the following missive from Passariano to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Pèrigord:

Vice-Admiral François-Paul Brueys d’Aigalliers (1753-98). He led the French fleet for the invasion of Malta and was later killed at the naval Battle of the Nile. Photo: frenchempire.net

“Why do we not seize the island of Malta? Admiral Brueys could easily anchor there and seize the place. Four hundred knights and at most a regiment of five hundred men are the sole defence of the city of Valletta. The inhabitants numbering over one hundred thousand are very much in our favour and dislike the Knights, who are unable to subsist and are dying of hunger. I have purposely confiscated their property in Italy. With the island of St Pierre, ceded to us by the King of Sardinia, with Malta, Corfù, etc., we will be masters of the whole Mediterranean.”

Bonaparte continued pressing the French government for an early decision regarding Malta. Ten days later, on September 23, 1797, he wrote a letter to the Executive Directory of France in the following terms:

“Our squadron abandoning these waters, in returning to  France, could take some troops and, while passing by, land a garrison of 2,000 men at Malta, an island which sooner or later will belong to Britain if we have the stupidity of not forestalling them. May you take a resolution which will authorise me to cultivate the means of information which I already have in Malta and at the moment which I will consider opportune, seize the place and put a garrison therein.”

This letter explicitly states that Bonaparte had spies, or collaborators, in Malta who were supplying him with detailed data about the island, information that filled him with great confidence that he would be able to overcome the island’s massive defences, though his letter to Talleyrand also displays a certain amount of overconfidence. It is also clear that Bonaparte had already fashioned his military strategic plans and that all he needed was the government’s concurrence. Coincidentally, on the same day, Talleyrand answered Bonaparte in these words:

“The Directory approves your ideas regarding Malta. Since Malta now has an Austrian Grand Master, M. de Hompesch, the Directory has confirmed its suspicion, already based on other facts, that Austria is bound to take over that island; she is trying to become a maritime power in the Mediterranean.”

Malta sooner or later will belong to Britain if we have the stupidity of not forestalling them

Manuel de Godoy (1767-1851) in a portrait by Antonio Carnicero. He was the Spanish Secretary of State when Spain was at war with Britain. Photo: en.wikipedia.org

Four days later, Talleyrand sent Bonaparte yet another communication stating that “…it is important to be before Austria, England and Russia in this matter. New facts that have come to the notice of the Directory have confirmed it in its opinion… that the island, which has become the centre of Austrian, Russian and English intrigues, and governed by an Austrian grand master, is on the eve of falling to the Emperor and his allies… The Directory authorises you to give Admiral Brueys all necessary orders to take Malta, to hinder Austria from taking it as it had done in the case of Ragusa [i.e. Dubrovnik]. Her taking possession of Ragusa makes it legitimate for us to take possession of Malta and it is our duty to put that island out of the avid clutches of Austria.”

And Bonaparte did not have to wait long for his government’s further blessing because, on October 3, 1797, he received the following communication from L.M. La Révellière-Lépeaux, president of the Executive Directory:

“The details in your letter of 23 September and the copy you forwarded to Rear-Admiral Brueys have satisfied the government. You will be receiving the necessary orders regarding the need to prevent the island of Malta from being occupied by the British or other enemies of the Republic. Your plans and ideas have all been approved and will be forwarded to the Minister of the Marine [naval forces] together with the orders you have requested.”

Paul Barras (1759-1829) in a portrait by Hilaire Le Dru. He was a very influential member of the French Executive Directory. Photo: en.wikipedia.org

Although Bonaparte had not received a direct order to invade Malta, he did not waste time and sent to the island the First Secretary of the French Legation at Genoa, Henri Poussielgue, on the pretext that he was inspecting French interests in the East. Actually, he came to Malta to apply the finishing touches for the capture of the island. A further excuse was that he was visiting his cousin, Mattias Poussielgue, who was a rich banker and the Captain of the Port of Malta.

In fact, the real reason behind Poussielgue’s visit is made amply clear in a letter that Bonaparte wrote to Talleyrand on November 14, 1797, in which he wrote the following: “I am sending you a copy of the mission I entrusted to Poussielgue and of my letter to the consul at Malta. The real reason behind Poussielgue’s mission was to carry out the last measures in our projects for Malta.”

In his letter to the French consul in Malta, Jean Andrè Caruson, Bonaparte requested him to “aid Poussielgue with all the information you have at your disposal and with your advice in everything connected with his mission”. Henri Poussielgue’s stay at Malta lasted 18 days (from December 25, 1797, to January 11, 1798), when he was in continuous contact with the collaborators the French had in the island. It seems that Poussielgue carried out his reconnaissance mission as expected and, acting upon his orders, on February 8, 1798, he drew up a report on his sojourn at Malta. The report was quite detailed and, as shall be noted, imparted useful information regarding the situation in Malta as seen through foreign eyes.

Louis-Marie de Révelliére-Lépeaux (1753-1854) in a portrait by François Gérard. He was president of the Executive Directory of France, as the French government was known. Photo: fi.wikipedia.org

Put very briefly, Poussielgue’s report stated that two-thirds of the 600 members of the Order at Malta were French but that only about 15 to 20 of them favoured the French Republic, though most of them wished to return to France if they were pardoned. Malta was strongly fortified but, if one discounted the knights who were the fulcrum of the defence, the country could be considered to be half-won.

According to Poussielgue, Grand Master Hompesch was popular among the Maltese but a substantial number of the inhabitants of the cities disliked the knights, though the populace of the countryside either sided with the Order or were indifferent.

The report refers to the financial difficulties faced by the Order and stated that the deficit in the accounts increased every year. Because of this, there was the risk that the British, the Russians or the Austrians would occupy Malta if the French did not forestall such a move.

Poussielgue also stated that he held between 10 and 12 meetings with the local collaborators of the French and that he had discussed with them the best means by which the islands would be captured in the shortest possible time and at the least risk.

This report was not submitted by a long-standing resident of Malta but by a person who looked at local affairs through foreign eyes and not through tinted lenses. This was exactly what Bonaparte was after and wanted: factual information about the situation within the Maltese islands and data that was untainted with any personal interests.

This report pointed out the way and the strategy that Bonaparte had to follow: a direct attack helped and facilitated by the friends he had behind the fortifications and within the Order itself so that victory would be achieved within the shortest time possible.

(To be concluded)

Joseph F. Grima, retired casual history lecturer and Asst Director of Education