Chapter 570 of the Laws of Malta lays the parameters and provides for damages in cases of defamation as a consequence of another’s actions. Case number 60/2019 RM decided on July 7, 2022 dealt with a series of tweets uploaded online by the defendant, which according to the plaintiff, had the aim of disturbing and reducing the plaintiff’s personal and professional reputation, integrity and honour based on allegations and insinuations which were untrue and false.
The case concerned tweets published in February 2018, and March 2019. By a preliminary judgement, the court had declared that the action concerning the 2018 publications was time-barred since a year had lapsed from date of publication until date of filing of the defamations suit; which was the 27th of March 2019. Thus the court thus only considered the March 2019 tweets in its deliberations.
Identification of the aggrieved person
The court observed that for a defamation suit to be successful, there must be an inference drawn to tie the aggrieved person to the publication, as if the aggrieved person is not identified in the publication, one cannot consider that such a person did actually suffer damage to his or her reputation by consequence of the publication.
On this fact, the court quoted and referred to Collins; “A statement can identify a person even though the person is not referred to by name, if it contains material which would lead people acquainted with the person to believe that he or she was the person referred to. Any damages award in such a case needs to take into account that not every person to whom the statement was published will necessarily have understood it to be of and concerning the claimant.”
On this matter, the court concluded that even though the plaintiff’s full name was not published, the tweet did include surnames and the profession the plaintiff practised, making the claimant sufficiently identifiable. The plaintiff also proved that there were individuals who had indeed identified him from the tweets.
The gist of these tweets as published by the defendant was that the plaintiff had committed tax fraud, and such fraud could have possibly been the motive behind a homicide of an investigative journalist; followed by a question as to why the plaintiff and his associate had not yet been arrested in relation to these facts (being the tax fraud and not the homicide itself).
Proof of damage to one’s reputation
On proof of damage to one’s reputation, the court quoted ‘Gatley On libel and Slander’:
“Proof that serious harm to reputation has actually occurred will obviously suffice but the claimant need only prove that such harm was likely. The harm need not manifest itself in financial terms, though it may do so: serious harm for the purposes of this provision may also be established by proof that the effect of the libel was to cause others to shun the claimant, or that the claimant was caused serious injury to feelings, distress, hurt and/or humiliation.”
The court further acknowledged that it is generally accepted that alleging that a person is “dishonest or a fraud, a hypocrite, dishonourable, immoral, or actuated by some improper motive, insolvent or unwilling to pay debts or incompetent or otherwise unfit for some role” because of their actions, is considered to be defamatory as once they are identifiable such allegations place one’s integrity in bad light and may cause serious prejudice to one’s reputation. In this case, such allegations, among other consequences led to the revocation of licenses which the plaintiff enjoyed prior to the tweets.
The defendant, author of the tweets in question, defended the case whereby among others he claimed that the plaintiff had not even been mentioned by name in the tweets in questions. Furthermore, he claimed that this was his honest opinion, that the publication amounted to a fair comment regarding an event of public interest which are reasonable in a democratic society, and that the publications were tantamount to a ‘privileged statement’.
The onus of proof of whether a statement can be regarded as a privileged statement or otherwise, is burdened on the person alleging it; in this case, the author of the tweets himself.
A privileged statement can be classified as such if it is a publication on a matter of public interest which has already been given publicity in a manner accessible to a large audience on an established medium; or the publication is a peer-reviewed statement in a scientific or academic journal; or the publication is a report of court proceedings protected by ‘absolute privilege’.
Publications covered by absolute privilege include publications of reports of any proceedings in a court of justice in Malta, any evidence given in good faith and according to law before a court or before a tribunal, publications made in pursuance of an Act of Parliament or by authority of the President of Malta or of the House of Representatives, or publications consisting of communications between public officers, contractors of the public service or officials of public corporations, reports of inquiries held in terms of any law, or statements by public officers that are made in good faith in the public interest including the interests of national security, territorial integrity, public safety, the prevention of disorder or crime or for the protection of health or morals.
Facts and honest opinion
The court found that by publishing the tweets in question, the defendant was not acting specifically and solely to harm the plaintiff or to create controversy but had based his tweets on a factual basis and such constituted his honest opinion.
Quoting Gatley on the defence of ‘honest opinion’, the court reproduced the following quote: “There are matters on which the public has a legitimate interest or with which it is legimitately concerned, and on such matters it is desirable that any person should be able to comment freely, and even harshly, so long as he does so honestly and without malice”… being “lack of belief in the opinion expressed.”
After careful and detailed deliberations the court declared that the defendant’s tweets did refer to the defendant’s honest opinion and so the plaintiff’s requests were denied with costs against him.
Rebecca Mercieca is an associate at Azzopardi, Borg and Associates Advocates.