When the Soviet Union was dissolved in December 1991, it was not entirely clear what would follow. As the successor countries became sovereign nations, their new beginning felt unreal. Homo sovieticus, despite being very cynical about his country’s communist “achievements”, had a sense of belonging to the whole of a territory stretching over 12 time zones.
This was enforced by the deliberate diffusion of ethnicities under Stalin and the use of Russian as the lingua franca. Industrial production was not clustered, but parcelled out to the “republics” in a way which made supply chains only functional over the whole SU. To make this work, transport prices never reflected the real economic cost. It was not more expensive to ship a part from Minsk to Vladivostok than to truck a typewriter to the outskirts of Moscow.
What welded the whole together was a Russian racism which, without much self-reflection, belittled citizens of Central Asia and the Caucasus as “black asses” and Ukrainians as “khokhol”, the word for wheat sheaves, or Barbarian hair tufts. The KGB and army leaders were predominantly ethnic Russians. Everyone thought this was normal. Tajiks, working as cheap labourers in Moscow, are still regularly beaten up.
The power vacuum caused by the dissolution of the Union and the Communist Party was quickly filled by old-guard party leaders in the successor republics, who sought legitimacy by nationalist and populist posturing and resorting to control by force. In places, this was not entirely successful. Violent, civil strife erupted in many regions.
Russia, more self-assured, experienced a period of new freedoms and liberty under Yeltsin and a sense of relief not having to subsidise underdeveloped regions post communism anymore. Nationalism as means of gaining legitimacy was still the default option for all. All countries took their new borders as a given, despite the historic arbitrariness. The industrial interconnectedness still bracketed them together to a large degree as did industrial theft by oligarchs and endemic corruption.
Ukraine, which suffers the same moral decay inherited from homo sovieticus, occupied a rather unique position insofar as Ukrainians considered themselves part of the Soviet-Russian legacy. They spoke Russian, not only for transactional practicability, but also out of snobbery. They had the closest business and intelligence ties with their bigger neighbour and the least qualms about Russian nationalism.
Yet, under the surface, a deep animosity lingered between the west of the Ukraine, with its epicentre Lvov, and the industrial heartlands of Donbas in the Russian self-identifying east. This antagonism is older than the Soviet Union, and perhaps even older than Imperial Russia. When the Wehrmacht invaded the SU, many in the west initially celebrated them as independence-bringing liberators.
When successive Ukrainian governments tried to chart their way into the 21st century, they increasingly relied on the nationalists in western Ukraine. Russian seized to be an official language in 1997. This culture war intensified over the years. Russian print and TV media were shut down, the import of Russian books, which used to be 60 per cent of all titles on sale, was banned, and a new Law on Education forbade teaching in Russian. Thirty per cent of Russian-speaking Ukrainians became second-class citizens as a result.
The Americans were first to fear the unpredictability of this new nationalism and worked hard to having the stockpiles of nukes moved from the Ukraine to Russia. As Russia declared itself the only rightful successor to the SU, it seemed safer to have them looking after the Bomb, rather than its former satellites. When, after the reunification of Germany, it became apparent how little Russia could object against the extension of NATO, the defence pact was quickly extended to Central and Eastern Europe, and then to the ex-Soviet republics of
Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. It was a matter of why not, rather than a thoughtful strategy. More members meant more contradictions between member states, heightened risk and dispersing strategic purpose. When NATO looked obsolete, we acted to make it indispensable.
Nationalism is and always has been a sure vote winner in stagnant Russia- Andreas Weitzer
Both Ukraine as well as Georgia were loftily invited to join NATO by Bush Jr in 2008. Shortly afterwards, Georgia was invaded by Russia. With the Orange Revolution (2004), which brought the nationalists Julia Timoshenko and Victor Yushchenko of the “Fatherland Party” to power, and the Euromaidan Putsch (2014), which ousted the Russian-friendly, equally corrupt Victor Janukovich, the scene was set for the US to bring Ukraine firmer into its orbit. Again: just because it could, not because it should.
For Putin, who has to cover for failing his country economically and socially, the revival of Soviet influence zones is his guarantor of legitimacy. Nationalism is and always has been a sure vote winner in stagnant Russia. The Donbas insurgency and the Crimea discontent was swiftly exploited. Putin’s “little, green men” were less instrumental than the humiliation of Russian speakers in Donetsk. Ukraine, adamant to restore its national borders to 1992 glory, was doubling down on its contempt for its Russian minority.
Since 2014, when the rebel territories were established, it seized to pay pensions and salaries, and bombed them on a daily basis. Since 2014, it received US weapons and training to reconquer Donbas successfully.
On the international parquet, Russia’s positions, initially more respectful of international norms than the US, were systematically ignored. They protested against the bombing of Belgrade in 1999, which was illegal under International Law. While Russia was still supporting the invasion of Afghanistan, her protests against the Iraq invasion, the Arab spring enthusiasm, the destabilisation of Libya and Syria, fell on deaf ears. Why would anyone listen to them, a mere “regional power” (Obama)?
We have taken sides in a conflict for 20 years when we should have abstained. By doing so, we have created a dynamic where we cannot step back anymore. Putin and his imperial cravings, aimed also at his domestic support, is simply too dangerous to go unchecked. Putin’s vanity and his vaingloriousness knows no bounds. His war has an economic reward too: the Donbas is the industrial heartland of Ukraine.
A truce with Russia would demand that Ukraine rolls over and relinquishes the bulk of its assets, no matter how war-ravaged. This cannot be in our interest anymore. It is certainly not in the interest of the Ukrainians; even ethnic Russian’s in Ukraine’s villages will not forgive how their lives have been uprooted by Russian aggression.
Yet the hope that Russia will be bowed by sanctions and military support for Ukraine is misplaced. Do we think that Ukraine can invade Russia? What makes the situation even more hopeless is that the former KGB officer in the Kremlin sees lying as a legitimate tool of diplomacy. Only his signature on an agreement would vouchsafe anything. We have a war at hands which seems unstoppable, even if we tried.
To try, like Merkel and Macron did, is seen as the betrayal of a common cause. The West is adamant to isolate Russia permanently and to weaken it within, ostensibly to limit its capacity of further land grabs. We base our war efforts on a narrative delivered by Ukraine. This is strengthening Putin’s false claim to fight a just war of cultural and national survival. In his eyes, Ukraine is a puppet in the great scheme of American imperialism. Many Russians are willing to suffer hardship for his battle.
For us retail investors, this means certain uncertainty. The war will drag on as long as we deliver weapons which we must. As Russia can never be subdued, this means fragile armistices at best, used by both sides to gather military strength. Without mediation, both war parties will never surrender, bar a nuclear strike – a risk always looming. Sanctions will not be lifted for the foreseeable future, and the destruction of Ukraine will broaden.
We will have to manage our economies without Russian raw materials and energy which will handicap Europe. Despite their harmful actions in the past, we can only pray that the United States will stay on board. For how long?
Andreas Weitzer is an independent journalist based in Malta.
The purpose of this column is to broaden readers’ general financial knowledge and it should not be interpreted as presenting investment advice, or advice on the buying and selling of financial products.
andreas.weitzer@timesofmalta.com