Almost five months after Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, we still cannot be certain about why key events have unfolded the way they did and how things will go. Malta’s strategic thinking will, therefore, need to factor radical uncertainty at the very heart of its decision-making process.
Why speak of radical uncertainty when self-confident clairvoyance is ubiquitous in public discussion?
No doubt, the leaders of the US, the UK, France, Russia, China and other leading intelligence powers know more than they’re letting on in public. But even they cannot be sure how far the war will escalate. Nor can European leaders be sure of the consequences of accepting – two or three years ahead of schedule – Ukraine as a candidate for EU membership. In complicated scenarios, there’s room for things to go seriously wrong.
In any case, Malta isn’t privy to all that such powers know. There’s no reason to take everything said publicly at face value. Public statements – by both sides – are the propaganda arm of this war, even when presented as news.
Just how radical is the uncertainty? Enough to make unclear what will work in the short and long runs.
First, clued-up scholars and former diplomats can agree that Putin’s war is to be condemned but still disagree about the reasons for the invasion.
They disagree about whether there’s real evidence that Putin wants to recreate the Russian empire.
They do agree that Putin reacted to an existential threat, which means they all acknowledge that he might use tactical nuclear weapons as a last resort. They disagree, however, whether the perceived threat was NATO enlargement or Ukrainian democratisation (Putin’s fear that it might destabilise his regime).
If it’s the first, then NATO has to bear some part of the blame for encouraging Ukraine to embark on a dangerous path. (Everyone has a right to walk through Central Park at night but anyone who advises you to do so is irresponsible.) If it’s democratisation, then the fault is all Putin’s.
Knowing the true reasons behind the invasion is critical to avoiding both appeasement and dangerous escalation.
Some day, assuming World War III is averted, national and personal archives will be opened. Then, we’ll know. Until then, responsible decision-making needs to entertain alternative scenarios at once.
A second reason for uncertainty: we can’t be sure why France, Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark dropped their objections to giving Ukraine candidate status.
It’s unlikely that a man as sure of himself as France’s Emmanuel Macron changed his mind so soon after voicing his scepticism. He was, after all, echoing a broad, pre-war consensus that it would take Ukraine at least till the mid-2030s to be ready for membership.
It’s possible that Macron came to believe he was mistaken. But it could also have been US pressure. Or a calculation, based on new information, that the “win” of EU membership could give Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky the necessary domestic clout to make limited territorial concessions to Putin and bring a negotiated end to a war that could drag on for years, with grave damage to the EU and catastrophic ones for Ukraine.
Martyrdom has until now not been a criterion for accelerating membership negotiations- Ranier Fsadni
Time will tell. For the moment, we don’t know, however. The uncertainty matters. It extends beyond the simple decision of accepting Ukraine’s candidacy.
The Ukrainian nation is undergoing a collective martyrdom but martyrdom has until now not been a criterion for accelerating membership negotiations. Introducing that criterion changes the identity of Europe, not just Ukraine.
Events will now hasten the development of a shared strategic culture in Europe. It’s clear that the EU will need a fully-fledged security and defence policy.
In practice, you can’t have such a policy without greater centralisation of decision-making. That will affect even neutral states like Malta, with a national interest in more rather than less subsidiarity.
Ukraine’s candidacy will make Europe’s identity even more defined by its eastern boundary than it already is. We already have an inkling how.
Ukrainian officials have demanded accelerated membership, saying anything less would be the death of the European dream. You can understand why that’s true for them. But the European dream – like the American dream – is many things.
It’s also the dream of a social Europe and a Europe of liberties.
Those dreams, already under pressure, could be threatened by accelerated accession without the proper foundations. The problems in Poland and Hungary will seem tame in comparison.
Ukrainian officials are already demarcating 2030 as their target. The Netherlands, among other members, has pushed back. But we have to see what negotiations, prolonged beyond Ukrainian expectations, do to public opinion within Ukraine.
In Serbia, a candidate since 2012, support for membership has fallen dramatically over the past year. What would a Ukrainian sense of betrayal – acute because hopes had been high – do to the EU? Would it bring Russia – even a post-Putin Russia – back in?
What resources and attention would such a turn of events command from Brussels? And would it come at the expense of resources and attention needed on the southern boundary?
The answers cannot be deduced. They depend on decisions still to be taken. To a limited but real extent, those decisions, and their consequences for Malta, depend on decisions that Malta begins to take today.
Strategy isn’t just a plan; it’s a process. Before we take those decisions, we need to get the process right. There needs to be broad consultation and room for radical uncertainty.