Criminal courts should “take all the time necessary” before making a final decision on freezing orders, the country’s top court decreed in a major judgment on Monday.

While it dismissed an appeal filed by Keith Schembri, Konrad Mizzi and other applicants, the constitutional court said it would be better if the law allowed the courts to extend permissible time limits, rather than impose a blanket seven-day limit for appeals.

The priority, it said, was to ensure that the fundamental rights of those targeted by such orders are not placed at risk.

The important pronouncement was delivered on Monday in an appeal filed by Schembri, Mizzi and a number of other defendants among the first tier of individuals and companies facing criminal prosecution linked to the Vitals magisterial inquiry.

Schembri and Mizzi were fronting a challenge to current laws, which give defendants who are targeted with a freezing order seven working days to contest such orders.

Defendants who filed the legal challenge argued that caused an inequality of arms between the prosecution and defence. While prosecutors had plenty of time to draft requests for freezing orders, they only had seven working days to object to them.

Moreover, given the complexity of certain money laundering cases, seven working days to contest a freezing order possibly worth millions of euros and an equal term within which the judge must decide, was not enough, they said.

Schembri, Mizzi and others said article 36(8)(ii) of the Proceeds of Crime Act resulted in a breach of their rights to a fair hearing and the peaceful enjoyment of property.

In July, the First Hall, Civil Court in its constitutional jurisdiction dismissed their grievances, concluding that they had suffered no breach of rights and that such issues concerning freezing orders fell “entirely within the discretion of the Criminal Court.”

The applicants appealed that decision.

On Monday the Constitutional Court, presided over by Chief Justice Mark Chetcuti and Judges Giannino Caruana Demajo and Anthony Ellul, rejected the appeal but sent out a significant direction to Criminal Court judges.

They concluded that Schembri and Mizzi could not argue that the seven-day time limit was insufficient in their case, as they had had filed their request to revoke the freezing orders within the seven days allowed by law.

In general, the law lays down a time limit so as to avoid unnecessary delays, to promote efficiency and also so that the parties can know beforehand the time frame within which they are to expect a decision.

However, there are cases which due to various factors, such as their nature and the number of defendants involved, call for a degree of “flexibility.”

“Unfortunately the legislator put all cases in one basket as though all cases are the same, when they are not,” said the judges.

It would be more appropriate if the law were to grant courts the opportunity to extend the seven day time limit after clearly stating the reasons for doing so.

In any case, pending a final decision on freezing orders, such orders remain in force and thus there is no risk that any proceeds are lost.

“Obviously the interpretation of these dispositions of law lies within the competence of the criminal courts,” went on the judges.

Each case needs to be assessed on its merits and the Criminal Court is best placed to decide what time it needs to reach its decision, bearing in mind that such issues must be decided within a reasonable time.

Consideration must also be made to the effects which such orders have on the subject person whose assets are targeted by the freeze.

In Schembri and Mizzi’s case, the court was not convinced that the seven-day time limit breached their rights.

But should the Criminal Court sense a “genuine and necessary” need to hear witnesses or should there be a legitimate reason to take more than seven working days before deciding whether to confirm, vary or revoke such orders, then it must do so.

In such cases, if the court were to apply “strictly” the statutory time limit, the defendants’ claims might not be fully assessed and that could obstruct their right to an effective remedy.

The Constitutional Court thus “invited” the Criminal Court to proceed in this manner, minuting clearly why it needed more time beyond the seven days without unduly prolonging its decision.