The IGC and the divisions in Europe's international role

An interesting recent paper on the European Convention, the draft Constitution and the European Union's external relations went beyond a mere exposé of the effects and implications for the EU and its international role.

One of the things it set out to do was to outline the well-established divisions that exist within the Union between the 'Atlanticists' (primarily the UK, Portugal, the Netherlands and Spain), the reservations of the neutral and the non-aligned (Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden) and the 'Europeanists' (including Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg).

Those familiar with the workings of the Convention will no doubt confirm that they saw these divisions surface in the Convention itself.

On one hand we had a group that feared the prospect of challenging or undermining the role of NATO although this was partially addressed through the clause that "in the execution of closer co-operation on mutual defence, the participating member states shall work in close co-operation with NATO".

This point is important because the draft constitution appears to refer to a common defence in the EU and a mutual defence among a group of nember states.

All the acceding countries, except Malta and Cyprus, are already or are about to become NATO members.

Regarding the neutrals and the non-aligned, as the mentioned paper pointed out, the extension of a defence role to the EU "may not only cause immense political difficulties for these countries, but may also lead to negative knock-on effects for EU support generally in these countries."

The last group, the Europeanists, have always advocated a stronger role for Europe in all aspects of security and defence. This would imply minimal, or no dependence on NATO or the US for Europe's security and defence needs. Earlier this year we had various occasions, foremost of which a mini-summit which indicated clearly the move towards further development of European autonomy in this particular area.

Although the mutual defence clause is theoretically open to all EU states, it is obvious that some will choose not to associate themselves with such an arrangement. A situation that has prompted the following question : What then is the benefit of a mutual defence arrangement that covers only a number of EU states ?

It will also be interesting to find out how the EU's relations with the UN will evolve, particularly after the Iraqi war debacle which has proved to be a highly sensitive issue.

If we want to experience a truly meaningful and profound debate on the draft constitution it is imperative that we should examine its likely impact on both the EU in general and its external relations in particular.

As far as Malta is concerned it is vital that we should continue to insist that our neutrality is zone specific and sui generis because the neutrals' interpretation of their own neutrality tends to vary.

In a recent study, Realigning neutrality? Irish defence policy and the EU, it was made clear that during the Nice EU Treaty negotiations, the Irish government had indicated that "under no circumstances" would it agree to an EU mutual defence agreement like that in the WEU and NATO treaties.

On that occasion its foreign minister had also indicated that there would be no referendum on Irish participation in the ERRF (European Rapid Reaction Force) adding that he would not be put off by supporters of isolationism masquerading as advocates of neutrality. And yet, way back in 1962 the Irish Premier had stated that while Ireland did not accede to the North Atlantic treaty, "we have always agreed with the general aim of that Treaty".

The point at issue is that while Ireland may be militarily neutral about defence, it is not militarily neutral about security. Thus a better description of Irish security and defence policy would be non-alignment, not neutrality since non-alignment still means that Ireland is not a member of a collective or mutual defence alliance such as NATO, while non-alignment does not imply, as military neutrality does, that Ireland is not prepared to use force or deploy its troops for collective security and crisis management operations. Ireland's full participation in the ERRF and the CESDP is a reflection of this.

In fact in the study in question it has been argued that non-alignment does not mean that the Irish government would not respond in the case of a attack on an EU nation which required an EU defensive response.

I am bringing all these points up not for us to reconsider our position on neutrality and non-alignment, but to ensure that if and when a fully fledged parliamentary debate on the forthcoming IGC does take place, the aspect of future external relations of and within the EU will be given the importance that it warrants.

Whatever stance we adopt we must ensure that the erosion of our neutrality will not take place. One has to remember that no matter how fluid other countries' interpretation of neutrality might be, at the time of the Kosovo war, Austria had held firm and even subjected itself to criticism for the fact that NATO could not fly through its airspace. On the other hand, Finland, through President Ahtisari, had played a positive role in the resolution of the conflict. With the difference that on that occasion Ahtisari had played a positive role in the resolution of the said conflict through his role as EU negotiator.

I personally believe that through our status of neutrality and non alignment we can play an important role within the Union in promoting European peace and security. Rather than coming across as isolationist we will still be contributing in our own way towards the evolution of a more effective collective security policy within the EU itself.

Leo Brincat is the main Opposition spokesman on foreign affairs and IT; leo.brincat@gov.mt