The start of a human being

Regarding the letter by Fr Joseph Mizzi (The Beginning of Life, November 9), I would like to add that I agree completely with the Pope's quotation to respect individual human life fully in all its phases. The start of human life is not a gradual process but an instant beginning. The question is whether this instant beginning of individual human life commences at penetration of the ovum by the sperm or at syngamy of the pro-nuclei containing the father's and mother's genetic material respectively!

I had previously read the document by the Irish Bishops' Conference keeping in mind that the German Bishops' Conference reacted differently to this issue. The American Bishops' Conference contains both definitions on its website. The Irish quotation contains its inherent sophisms.

1. "The pro-nuclear embryo development... is biologically human". Question. Does one extend moral respect to all material that is biologically human? No! The sperm cell is also biologically human but it does not merit any moral respect.

2. "The pro-nuclear embryo has an organic unity and is oriented towards on-going development" i.e. what one calls continuous ontological development. Question. Does ontological development of a biological entity such as the penetrated ovum automatically confer upon it the moral respect due to a human individual being? No! The development of the sperm cell also produces an ontological entity, a sperm cell, which merits no moral respect.

3. "The pro-nuclear embryo". Question. Does this term exist embryologically? No! According to the International Embryological Terminology, the embryo does not exist before syngamy or amphimixis leading to the zygote. At this stage it is called an ootid.

4. "The pro-nuclear embryo". Question. Does this exist at penetration? No! The penetration by the sperm of the secondary oocyte only produces a pro-nuclear ootid two to eight hours after penetration after the second meiotic division has occurred and the second polar body extruded.

5. Question. Once the second meiotic genetic division takes place after penetration and a completely different set of albeit separate genes, from those in the preceding penetrated secondary oocyte, now exist in the ootid, does this qualify as a change in ontological continuity? Yes! In a single cell organism a drastic change in the genetic content of the cell would change its identity and therefore its ontological continuity. The ontological identity of the cell before the second meiotic division is not the same as that of the same cell after its ontological continuity has been interrupted. The composition of the genetic information is a necessary condition for cellular identity.

6. Question. Does a human zygote with the inherent capacity to develop towards the mature adult form always develop after penetration? No! A large percentage of penetrated ova develop into other entities which do not have a human nature e.g. parthenogenesis (Hira gene), hydatidiform mole, choriocarcinoma, invasive carcinoma. If simple penetration of the ovum established human form, then according to Aristotle's hylomorphic theory, as long as that matter is still alive it should only form a human being. After syngamy, one always gets a human being even if things go wrong.

7. Question. Does the secondary oocyte at penetration or the ootid exhibit the nature of a human being? No! Does anyone know of human beings with complete 23 triploid sets of chromosomes, or those with half sets of chromosomes in different parts of the cell?

In order to qualify for moral consideration due to a human being, a human cell must contain the inherent capacity to develop into a mature human being, it has to have ontological developmental continuity, and it must have the nature of a human individual being. In the single cell embryo, the formation of a coalesced diploid genome is a necessary condition for all three.

The process of a human individual subject begins when process actually has a subject with the nature of a human being, not before. Process philosophy requires memory to establish individual identity. In the single cell human embryo, memory is represented by the coalesced diploid genome leading to a complete human cell. Is the dilemma any clearer now?