How US-Israeli strikes on Iran may play into Beijing’s hands

In rapid succession, the first few months of 2026 have seen a self-assured Trump administration deploy military force against two of Beijing’s closest geopolitical partners: Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

As in Venezuela, the primary objectives of the current campaign in Iran appears to be regime change, or, at least, the substantial weakening of the Islamic Republic, alongside stopping Iran’s nuclear programme and destroying its ballistic missile capabilities and naval forces.

Nonetheless, China looms largely in the background of the conflict as a secondary strategic target, with Washington seeking to curb Beijing’s influence in the Middle East by threatening its access to critical energy supplies.

China and Iran have sustained diplomatic relations since the 1970s, elevating them to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2016 during a regional visit by Xi Jinping. In 2021, the two sides signed a 25-year cooperation agreement designed to deepen economic, energy and security ties.

China promised to invest $400bn in Iran over 25 years despite only a fraction of the pledged investments has materialised. Although Beijing has formally endorsed international efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, decades of Western sanctions have pushed Tehran to rely heavily on China as a critical economic and diplomatic lifeline.

Today, China absorbs roughly 80 per cent of Iranian exports, making it Iran’s most important external partner. At the same time, Iran offers China a very cheap source of oil.

Beyond the economic dimension of the relationship, China and Iran share a common opposition to the US-led global order. Tehran participates in several Sino-led multilateral frameworks, including BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Belt and Road Initiative.

Iranian President Masoud Pezashkian’s appearance at China’s military parade marking Victory Day in September 2025 alongside other non-Western leaders reinforces the image of their shared anti-Western alignment.

Yet, the depth of the Sino-Iranian partnership should not be overstated. Iran accounts for only about 13.5 per cent of China’s total imports. Moreover, most Iranian oil entering China is purchased by independent ‘teapot’ refineries clustered in Shandong province, firms that Beijing does not regard as strategic national assets. Chinese policy elites have also expressed unease with Tehran’s leadership, often attributing Iran’s predicament to its own strategic miscalculations rather than external to pressure alone.

As US-Israeli strikes continue, China’s most immediate concern lies in the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway through which nearly 55 per cent of China’s oil imports from the region transits. Any closure of the strait would affect China raising energy prices, disrupting shipping routes and amplifying inflationary pressures at home.

Beijing has long sought to mitigate these risks by diversifying its energy sources. Oil imports have expanded from Russia (especially following the war in Ukraine), Latin America and Africa. Yet, the conflict still threatens China’s economic interests, a vulnerability amplified by US protectionist policies and China’s own economic slowdown.

In 2025, China’s exports to the Middle East grew nearly twice as fast as its exports to the rest of the world. Meanwhile, China has become a key investor across the region with projects spanning steel, electric vehicles, solar panels, liquefied natural gas production facilities, desalination projects and major port infrastructure, including the expansion of Israel’s Haifa Port and the United Arab Emirates’ Khalifa Port. However, these risks are not unique to China; other countries, including the United States, are equally affected.

China absorbs roughly 80% of Iranian exports

While the impact of the war on China should certainly not be dismissed, it may also present Beijing with strategic opportunities. Consistent with its Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, rooted in the respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity of states and non-interference, China is unlikely to assume the costly burden of direct military intervention in support of Iran. Instead, it can position itself as a distant observer while capitalising on the situation to strengthen its narrative power and diplomatic messaging on the global stage.

Official Chinese statements have framed US-Israeli actions as grave violations of Iranian sovereignty and security, breaches of the UN Charter and fundamental norms in international relations and unlawful attempts at regime change, evidence, in Beijing’s telling, of a return to the “law of the jungle” in international politics.

At an emergency session of the UN Security Council, China’s Ambassador Fu Cong described the timing of the strikes, launched amid ongoing US-Iran talks, as “shocking”. State media have echoed this message, arguing that the bombing in Iran “is not a failure of diplomacy; it is an abandonment of it”.

By calling for an immediate cessation of military operations, respect for national sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs and a prompt return to dialogue and negotiations, China positions itself as a global peacemaker.

This reinforces its image as a responsible and principled actor while presenting the China-centred Global Security Initiative as an alternative security vision to the current global disorder. This stance is echoed by China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi who said the conflict “is a war that should not have happened”, implicitly blaming American hegemonic behaviour.

Amid mounting global uncertainty, energy insecurity and inflationary pressures, such narratives may resonate far beyond Beijing’s traditional base in the Global South and may even find fertile ground in Europe. According to polls conducted in Spain, Italy, Germany and the UK, majorities in these countries reject US-Israeli military intervention in Iran.

European governments have reacted uneasily to the Israeli-US strikes on Iran, expressing frustration at the lack of prior consultation from Washington.  Several EU capitals appear increasingly wary of being drawn into a conflict that could have major repercussions on their doorsteps and whose strategic rationale remains contested.

While Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez is the only one having directly challenged US President Donald Trump over the war against Iran, calling it unjustified, dangerous and illegal, other signs are telling.

France has signalled openness to cooperating with China on de-escalation. Italian Minister of Defence Guido Crosetto, a member of the party led by Giorgia Meloni, one of Trump’s closest allies in Europe, has publicly questioned the legality of the US-Israeli campaign under international law.

While most EU leaders have carefully avoided open criticism of Washington, rising frustration with US policy and public opinion pressures may prompt them to reassess their relationship with Beijing, which has deteriorated significantly since the European Union adopted its 2019 framework describing China simultaneously as a partner, economic competitor and systemic rival. 

Equally important, military operation in Iran risks drawing the US into a prolonged conflict that could divert strategic attention away from the Indo-Pacific. US allies in Asia are already concerned that such a conflict could undermine “stability and peace in the Indo-Pacific” distracting Washington’s strategic focus and resource away from the region, potentially strengthening Beijing’s position and even increasing Xi’s appetite to reunify Taiwan.

In sum, a war intended to reinforce American dominance and weaken China’s global position may, ultimately, produce the opposite effect. Rather than emerging as the principal loser, Beijing could, once again, find itself among the quiet beneficiaries of Trump’s foreign policy.  

Angela Pennisi di Floristella is an associate professor, Department of International Relations, University of Malta.