The bastions that surround Malta’s Grand Harbour faced their greatest test at the beginning of the 19th century, not from enemy bombardment but in peace negotiations.

France had surrendered the island in September 1800 after its garrison in Valletta and the Three Cities was starved in a siege by the Maltese and their British and Portuguese allies, who, however, failed to breach the fortifications militarily.

Continental Europe was in turmoil at the time but hopes for a lasting peace emerged when the powers of the time, notably France, Britain and Russia, held talks that finally led to the Treaty of Amiens in 1802.

A new book, Napoleon – ‘Malta or War’ by former Times of Malta editor Victor Aquilina, gives a fascinating and little-known account of the Malta-related negotiations that led to the treaty, particularly Britain’s policy shifts over retaining Malta and Russia’s interests in the island.

One of a number of key issues was the future of Malta. Would it revert to the Order of St John or to the Kingdom of Naples? Would it be handed to Russia as Czar Paul had wanted when he was made grand master of the order after the knights had sought his help? Or would Britain retain it now that it was effectively in possession?

Czar Paul, who almost went to war against Britain over Malta, was assassinated well before the conclusion of the talks at Amiens, and his successor, Alexander I, was not so interested in the island.

And, for a time, Britain itself was not interested in keeping Malta, or so it seemed. Nelson himself did not think much of Malta as a naval base, though he later changed his opinion about the island’s value to Britain. In the peace talks, Britain had at first advocated Malta’s return of the Order so long as it remained neutral.

London picked Charles Cornwallis, a former general and statesman, for the peace talks at Amiens. Bonaparte, then first consul, greeted him warmly, telling him, among other things, that he was against having a Russian garrison in Malta as it would shift Russian trade through the southern communication of the Dardanelles instead of the Baltic, something which would be against the interests of both France and Britain.

Given Malta’s strategic importance, France, like Britain, wanted to ensure that the island remained neutral. France at one time backed Russia as a guarantor of the island’s neutrality should it be returned to the Order, without, however, allowing a Russian military presence on the island. Russia rejected the idea.

And then Bonaparte suggested blowing up the fortifications to effectively neuter the islands. In his view, the demolition of the fortifications was “the only effectual plan to remove all cause of future contention” between Britain and France, as well as the Order of St John.

Fortunately for Malta, however, London did not accept the suggestion, “but not without first giving it very serious consideration”, Aquilina says.

Cornwallis, as well as Henry Pigot, the general who received the French surrender in Malta, had agreed with Bonaparte’s idea, although Pigot was for partial, rather than complete, demolition.

The book is by former Times of Malta editor Victor Aquilina.

Had the suggestion been taken up, Malta would have lost its value as the impregnable fortress in the Mediterranean.

The Maltese were definitely against the Order being allowed back to rule over them, but, since the mighty bastions served as their defensive shield, they would have naturally protested against their demolition. Ironically, it was behind the very bastion walls that Bonaparte wanted to dismantle that his troops escaped to when the Maltese revolted against them.

The demolition of fortifications was not as outlandish an idea as some might make it out to be. Both French and British regiments had blown up fortifications in areas they had occupied in India, and Cornwallis himself was personally involved in such actions, Aquilina points out.

But, in eventually rejecting Bonaparte’s proposal, Britain pointed out that destroying the bastions would mean handing over Valletta to corsairs who would use Malta as their base for operations. The corsairs were at the time based in North Africa.

Bonaparte countered that Malta did not need such massive bastions to defend itself from corsairs. It could have sufficient defences which would not, however, make it an object of importance or jealousy to the powers of Europe.

Britain’s Admiral of the Fleet John Jervis and Foreign Secretary Lord Hawkesbury were among those who argued against demolition. 

Hawkesbury pointed out the difficulty of the task, the disgust it would create among the Maltese and those interested in the order’s return. British Prime Minister Henry Addington shared these views, arguing the Maltese might even have forcibly resisted the idea.

The protracted talks in Amiens ended with a treaty that provided for Malta’s return to the knights, who were to remain neutral and no longer have a French or English langue, but would have a Maltese langue – something Russia had strongly resisted.

But, as is well known, the Maltese rejected the treaty and called on Britain to stay. It did, not because of all the petitioning they made but because further French territorial expansion was disturbing the balance of power in Europe. 

Britain’s decision to keep Malta had France fuming and the two countries were back at war in just over a year, with one of the reasons being Malta, Napoleon having blurted out ‘Malta or War’ – the appropriate title of the new book.

The book, which has an interesting foreword by Prof. Joe Pirotta, is published by Kite.