Charles Debono continues his analysis of the various developments leading to the outbreak of World War II, focusing on their effect on Malta’s preparations for the outbreak of hostilities.

As mentioned in the first part of this article last Sunday, the political situation in Europe during the 1920s and 1930s brought about the rise of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy and their respective territorial ambitions. In the years preceding World War II, Benito Mussolini made frequent references to Malta being an integral part of Italia Irrendenta, and the British authorities on the island increasingly viewed Italian influence in Malta as an unwelcome intrusion. This led a clampdown on pro-Italian movements and personalities in Malta.

A recently arriving infantry battalion of the Malta Infantry Brigade passing along the Strada Reale (Republic Street) Valletta, on June 9, 1939.A recently arriving infantry battalion of the Malta Infantry Brigade passing along the Strada Reale (Republic Street) Valletta, on June 9, 1939.

In 1934, the Defence Security Office (DSO) was headed by Major (later Colonel) Beltram Ede. He worked in close liaison with the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Joseph Axisa. Members of the DSO managed to infiltrate all the then known front organisations from which small cells spied for Italy. Italian nationals forming these cells, as well as pro-Italian Maltese nationals, were put under constant surveillance, and between 1934 and 1936, Italian establishments established in the 1920s were closed down and Italian nationals were rounded up and deported.

The British continued suppressing all potential sources of Italian influence, be it cultural or political. In July 1936, the British withdrew the licence of the Istituto di Cultura Italiana, while and the Istituto Italiano Umberto Primo was severely restricted. The DSO, together with the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), kept Marchese Ferrante di Ruffano, the Italian Consul-General at 3, Old Mint Street, Valletta, under constant surveillance. Soon afterwards, the Italian consul was declared a persona non grata and was withdrawn by the Italian Foreign Ministry.

Mussolini’s territorial ambitions led to the Abyssinian Crisis in the mid-1930s so the British military authorities in Malta viewed any Italian military movements and territorial expansion as a possible threat to the islands.

Vickers Vildebeest torpedo bombers in formation Malta.Vickers Vildebeest torpedo bombers in formation Malta.

Construction of defensive lines of pillboxes

The use of attack aircraft had revolutioned the way a war was conducted. On August 23, 1935, the British authorities issued orders for anti-aircraft sections on the island to be manned on a war footing. British troop reinforcements were also sent to Malta in September 1935 to reinforce the garrison on the island, these comprising three battalions, including the 14th Infantry Brigade.

Following the Abyssinian Crisis in 1935-6, the British started building of the first type of defences, which consisted of digging of trenches and fitting of one or two emplacements for the Vickers machine guns. Accompanying these positions were small stone-clad concrete observation posts.

Following the Munich Crisis in September 1938, a new type of pillbox, more box-like in shape, began to appear. The pillboxes formed part of three defensive lines (or stop lines) aimed at stopping an enemy invasion and penetration in the defences of the island. Each defensive line was built on natural obstacles, beginning from the coastline and falling back inland following the geography of the land. All the pillboxes were given a code number consisting mainly of letters and numbers.

The Mediterranean Fleet in the 1930s

Malta had been the main base for Britain’s Mediterranean Fleet since the early decades of the 19th century. During the early 1930s there was a lack of funds for the Mediterranean Fleet to remedy certain deficiencies. This problem became more serious during the Abyssinian crisis of 1935-36. And when the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) broke out the Mediterranean Fleet and British-flagged merchant ships were called upon to evacuate from Spain British and nationals of other countries.

The incomplete Malta’s defences in 1939 was the result not of a lack of resolve but of inadequate resources

The Mediterranean Fleet was also kept on alert due to the increase of tension with Germany that culminated during the Munich Crisis of September 1938. Even after the crisis abated, the prospect of war with Germany and possibly Italy was quite clear and serious preparations for war continued.

HMS Warspite sits in the Grand Harbour between Senglea and Floriana in 1937.HMS Warspite sits in the Grand Harbour between Senglea and Floriana in 1937.

When Mussolini indicated that Italy intended to remain neutral at the time, the state of war readiness in Malta was reduced. Nevertheless, due to the Maltese islands’ proximity to Italy’s Regia Aeronautica aircraft based in Sicily, Malta was seen as too vulnerable so the British ordered its Mediterranean Fleet to leave Malta for the Alexandria naval base in Egypt. By the time Germany invaded Poland on September 1, the Mediterranean Fleet had already left Malta, and was concentrated at Alexandria, Egypt. Only seven submarines and 12 Motor Torpedo Boats (MTBs) were left in Malta, and the Mediterranean had been closed to merchant shipping.

The Munich Crisis

During the Munich Crisis in September 1938 (for further details see ‘The 1938 Czech crisis and the situation in Malta’, The Sunday Times of Malta, September 30, 2018), the British government declared a state of emergency. That same month, both the Royal Malta Artillery (RMA) and the Royal Artillery (RA) moved to their war stations by manning their anti-aircraft batteries. But with the end of the Munich Crisis, the anti-aircraft batteries returned to their peacetime status.

In December 1938, both the War Office and the Air Ministry were called to express their opinion, firstly on their estimation of scale of a possible Italian air attack on Malta. They were also asked how many anti-aircraft guns were needed to provide protection to the Mediterranean Fleet, making use of the HM Dockyard facilities without undue risk. The Air Ministry and the War Office concluded that the most appropriate way of providing air defence was through a balanced force of fighter aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, searchlights, detection equipment and barrage balloons.

Fairey IIIFs fly over units of the Mediterranean fleet in the Grand Harbour.Fairey IIIFs fly over units of the Mediterranean fleet in the Grand Harbour.

British insistence on defending Malta

During the last weeks and days of peace, Malta’s defences were still not well prepared for such an eventuality for various reasons. The general impression was that the defences of Malta were in a poor state due to the British authorities’ dilemma as to whether they should try to hold on to the fortress colony in case Italy attacked Malta.

However, according to Dr Douglas Austin in his book Churchill and Malta: A Special Relationship, he states that it was not true that Malta was not prepared and protected against an enemy attack due to its proximity to Sicily or that the Royal Air Force (RAF) had abandoned any hope to defend the island. He continues that the reservations expressed by the Air Staff did not indicate a belief on their part that Malta could not be defended against invasion or air attack. Rather they were doubtful whether the RAF could guarantee the safety of the naval base from air attack and thus permit its use by the British Mediterranean Fleet. Eventually, two defensive plans were proposed. The first one, known as Scale A, included 48 heavy, and 16 light anti-aircraft (LAA) guns, and one fighter squadron. The second alternative, known as Scale B, consisted of 112 heavy anti-aircraft (HAA) guns, 60 LAA guns, 24 searchlights and four squadrons of fighter aircraft. Therefore, a decision had to be taken, and on July 27, 1939, the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) finally adopted Scale B. Austin continues that this evidence makes it clear that the incomplete structure of Malta’s defences in 1939 was the result not of a lack of resolve but of inadequate resources.

However, despite the CID’s July decision that Malta should have substantially increased defences, only 12 more HAA guns had reached the island by the end of August, raising the total to 24, and no fighters were based there.

Savoia Marchetti SM.81. Source: www.airwar.ruSavoia Marchetti SM.81. Source: www.airwar.ru

Malta’s garrison in August/September 1939

In August 1939, the garrison’s main combat formation was the 1st Malta Infantry Brigade. It was composed and stationed as follows: the 2nd Battalion, Devonshire Regiment, was kept in reserve at Attard; the 1st Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment was deployed on the east coast, south of Valletta; the 2nd Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers, also defended the east coast north of Valletta and Wied iż-Żurrieq and Għar Lapsi area; and the 2nd Battalion, Queen’s Own Royal West Kents, were responsible for most of Marsaxlokk, and all the south coast, including Wied iż-Żurrieq and Għar Lapsi areas. There was also the 1st Battalion King’s Own Malta Regiment, which was allocated to defend the northern part of Malta.

Although, these infantry battalions had already been allocated to different parts of Malta, they maintained intensive training, and started constructing defencing posts. The diary of the Governor of Malta, Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, for August 22 records that “after breakfast on the 16th I went and saw the first batch of KOMR doing an extra fortnight’s training. They have certainly come on in most remarkable way and the fact of having done a month’s continuous training instead of only 15 days this year will have a permanent effect on them. We have now handed over to the KOMR the whole of the Marfa Peninsula and have built machine -guns posts for them. As they are a bit short of machine-guns, we have attached to them a few Royal Irish Fusilier machine-guns in the support posts... .”

Apart from the main combat formation there were also the support units, which consisted of the Royal Malta Artillery and composed of three coast defence batteries and three anti-aircraft batteries. The 1st Heavy Battery was deployed at Fort St Rocco, Fort Delimara and Fort Ricasoli; the 2nd Heavy Battery was deployed at Fort Tigné and Campbell Battery; the 3rd Heavy Battery deployed at Fort St Elmo; the 5th Anti-Aircraft Battery at Delimara and Tal-Qroqq, while the 6th Anti-Aircraft Battery and 7th Searchlight Battery at Mtarfa. There were also the 16th and 24th Royal Engineer Fortress Companies; the 1st and 2nd Malta Artisan Works Companies and the No. 1 and No. 2 Royal Engineer Bomb Disposal Companies.

Charles Debono is curator of the National War Museum.

(To be concluded)

HMS Eagle in Grand Harbour with HMS Royal Oak and Bighi Hospital in the background.HMS Eagle in Grand Harbour with HMS Royal Oak and Bighi Hospital in the background.

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