One of the first things I was taught at the University of Sussex a little more than a decade ago concerning the European Communities - as the European Union was known at the time - was that those elements that very often looked as a weakness of the European Communities, were very often some of the strongest elements that contributed to further progress in European integration.
Throughout its history, the EU has faced crises and every time it has emerged better and stronger than before. Most of the time, the EU found a solution as a result of its flexibility in dealing with the issues involved. During the past 50 years, the EU had to deal with such issues as "widening and deepening" on which member states very often had divergent views.
In addition to unrelated domestic issues, it is possible that the EU Constitution was perceived as a Treaty that would put an end to some of the EU's flexibility rather than enhance it. If anything, the current developments have helped to increase the discussion on the EU in those states where the EU is taken for granted. Perhaps the new Treaty should have been associated with another European city rather than labelled a "Constitution".
A lot has already been written about the negative outcome of the referenda in France and the Netherlands, hastily followed by the suspension of the process by the UK. It is an open secret that the UK is in favour of "widening" because it reckons that widening makes "deepening" more difficult.
The possibility of a negative vote in the current series of referenda was highlighted by the Danish Eurosceptic MEP Jens-Peter Bonde, in his elaborate contribution to the Convention in Brussels on October 1, 2002.
Among other things, he recalled that No votes were recorded in the referendum on the euro in Denmark in 2000, and in the referendum on the Nice Treaty in Ireland in 2001. One of the main arguments discussed by Mr Bonde is that very often there is not enough sensitivity and communication between the political leaders and the people that are expected to follow them.
In the case of the EU Constitutional Treaty, like earlier complex EU treaties, it is not easy for the public to appreciate all the implications of the various provisions. The majority of the voters do not have the patience or the eagerness to read such legal texts. So most of the voters simply tend to listen to what other political leaders or the media have to say about such a Treaty.
In Malta's case. in spite of the diametrically opposite positions of the Nationalist Party and the Malta Labour Party before Malta's EU accession, the two parties participated in the deliberations on the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.
Dr Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici seems to have forgotten that Dr. Alfred Sant and Dr George Vella represented Malta's Parliament on behalf of the MLP in those discussions, while Dr Michael Frendo and Dolores Cristina represented the Nationalist Party. Professor Peter Serracino Inglott and John Inguanez participated as representatives of the Maltese government.
If the Labour Party delegates were to heed Dr Mifsud Bonnici's arguments and vote against the EU Constitution, they would in effect be giving a vote of no confidence in Dr Sant's and Dr Vella's contribution to the European Convention.
Dr Mifsud Bonnici might have failed to notice the apparent change of heart between Dr Sant's first intervention on November 21, 2002 concerning a "privileged relationship" and other matters, and his more constructive second intervention on May 26, 2003, in spite of his reference to "voluntary withdrawal from the Union."
Prime Minister Lawrence Gonzi was right to take a position at last week's EU Summit and argue that every EU member state should be allowed to proceed with the ratification of the EU Treaty as it deemed fit. This flexibility on the part of the EU eventually won the day.
When it comes to the ratification of the EU Treaty in the House of Representatives, our government may also wish to consider the implications of the changed circumstances both on the domestic front as well as in Malta's new status within the EU. There is no doubt that both sides of the House had concluded that the Treaty was the best possible compromise obtainable at that point in time. But then Malta was still an accession candidate country.
Now Malta is a member state and it has a better say thanks to accession. In multilateral negotiations it is customary that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. Our government may need to consider what could happen if Malta expresses its positive vote when it knows that other EU states have already expressed a negative vote. Is it possible that the EU Constitutional Treaty could be revisited and re-negotiated? What would be the position of those member states that have already accepted the Treaty as it is? Will they forfeit their right to participate in future discussions?
If and when the Treaty were to be reopened, and if Malta would be in a position to participate in the deliberations, it may very well be that for Malta, the current developments could be a blessing in disguise. Eventually, Malta might even make its voice heard more forcefully if and when sections on qualified majority are discussed. One hopes that the two political parties would be in a better position to pull the same rope than they were doing during the negotiations between February 2002 and July 2003.