In July 2020, the House of Representatives unanimously approved a series of substantial improvements to the Maltese constitutional system.
The reforms included changes in the procedure for judicial appointments and discipline, alongside changes in the method of appointment of the President of Malta.
These constitutional modifications were constructed to improve the separation of powers and the inherent checks and balances in the Maltese constitutional framework.
They further portray this government’s continuous effort to fortify a system that endorses judicial independence and law enforcement under the rule of law.
These reforms complemented the Venice Commission’s conclusions from the December 2018 opinion where it assessed the constitutional figure of the Maltese prime minister, which appears to have been perceived as a holder of presidential style concentration of authority, and the traditional practice behind the appointments of members of the judiciary.
From a political point of view, one of the most significant amendments was the change in the manner of the election of the President of Malta.
Back when Malta became a republic in December 1974, the 1964 Independence constitution was marginally revised to guarantee a smooth transition from governor-general to the president.
Consequently, the ease with which the government of Malta could request and obtain the substitution of governor-general was adopted with regard to the establishment of the Office of President.
Thus, the 1974 amendments read that the President of Malta would be appointed by a resolution of the House of Representatives and similarly removed on alleged inability to perform the functions of the office or misbehaviour.
Since the 1974 constitution provided under article 71(1) that resolutions brought before parliament could be passed by a simple majority of those present and voting, for the last 46 years the head of state in Malta did not require anything more than a simple majority to be appointed or removed.
This criterion appears to be logically conducive to the President of Malta being appointed on considerations relating to the interests of the party in government on the day, which may or may not coincide with the unifying demands of the office, thereby leaving the latter to the ability and maturity of the appointee.
The Robert Abela administration did not hesitate to cede important powers and to put country before party and democracy before power- Edward Zammit Lewis
The reforms adopted on July 29, 2020, provided that the President of Malta will be elected by a two-thirds majority in parliament instead of by a simple majority.
Furthermore, the new constitutional provision affirms that, until the two-thirds majority in parliament is reached, the person occupying the role of president shall remain in office.
In addition, the president can now only be removed from office by the same qualified majority which elected him.
This reform meant that while, previously, the president could be removed even on a mere allegation of misbehaviour, under the new amendments, apart from the fact that a two-thirds majority is needed for such removal, any incapacity or misbehaviour alleged must be proven.
These constitutional amendments (ACT XLIV of 2020) have, therefore, strengthened the structural procedures behind the election of the president to ensure the person chosen to occupy the presidential office is ahead of state enjoying wide support among the representatives of all citizens, across the political spectrum.
Furthermore, the new legislative mechanisms proclaim the autonomy of the president, especially with regard to judicial appointments. As of July 2020, judges are appointed by the President of Malta within the limits of the advice of the Judicial Appointments Committee.
Members of the judiciary were nominated by the president only on the advice of the prime minister, presumably after having conducted some obscure ‘soundings’, until Act No. XLIV of 2016.
This constitutional amendment, approved by a two-thirds parliamentary majority, established a new Judicial Appointments Committee, a sub-committee of the Commission for the Administration of Justice (CAJ), to advise the government prior to the appointment of any magistrate or judge, except the chief justice.
The chief justice, the attorney general, the auditor general, the commissioner for administrative investigation (ombudsman) and the president of the Chamber of Advocates, comprised the committee.
The selection procedure was radically altered as a result of the 2020 revisions. The government no longer plays any role in proposing or approving the appointment of a member of the judiciary.
Additionally, for the first time, under the 2020 constitutional reforms, the chief justice is selected by a resolution of the House of Representatives approved by at least two-thirds of its members.
The new methods for the selection of the president and of the chief justice affirm the depoliticisation of key appointment processes through the requirement of wide support and strengthen the confidence in the choices made for such unifying roles.
The 2020 constitutional amendments reflect the evolution of a process of political maturity in transitioning from a constitutional set-up reminiscent of colonial style to one where the government is willing to shed important powers in order to strengthen the rule of law and democracy.
It is welcome that the president’s crucial role as a catalyst of this evolving political maturity was widely recognised. I am convinced that the present president, George Vella, is fulfilling his role of a president for all but these amendments put this in an authorised manner in our constitution.
The most significant contribution was made by the Robert Abela administration which, unlike others, did not hesitate to cede important powers and to put the country before the party and democracy before power.