Recently, attention has centred on the conclusion of the term of the current President of Malta, scheduled to end on April 4. Consequently, the appointment of a new president is needed before that date.
It is noteworthy that the forthcoming choice deviates from established procedures, needing a two-thirds majority agreement among MPs to finalise the selection. This significant development was enacted through a unanimous vote by the House of Representatives in July 2020 via Act 64 of 2020.
This development should not be perceived as a hindrance but, rather, as a highly positive democratic advancement. In navigating this process, political parties are called upon to demonstrate political maturity and identify an individual capable of uniting the nation.
Achieving this objective requires a departure from the practice of casually disclosing names through media outlets or unauthorised leaks. Rather, it requires earnest negotiations conducted with meticulous attention, prioritising the nation’s interests above all else.
A floated ‘proposed solution’, involving the popular vote for the appointment of the president, appears to stem from a misunderstanding of our constitutional and institutional framework. Such a suggestion confuses the ‘presidential system’ with that of our own, where the prime minister wields most executive powers.
In our system, akin to others such as the United Kingdom, it is the prime minister who requires the popular vote to lead the government and the country, not the president. Introducing a popular vote for the president could potentially lead to an institutional conflict with the prime minister, a scenario that should be carefully considered and avoided.
This does not imply a lack of authority for the president. While it is accurate that, in our system, the president primarily holds ‘residual powers’, it is essential to note that, in 2020, the president was granted unprecedented direct executive authority. This newfound power includes the appointment of judges without the need for prime ministerial advice, a prerogative successfully exercised on at least three occasions following the relevant amendment.
Presidents frequently engage in discussions about constitutional conventions. These deliberations have persisted for many years, with limited or no progress at all. From personal experience, as the person spearheading the 2020 constitutional amendments, it is evident that without the political will of Prime Minister Robert Abela, backed fully by the cabinet, the implementation of these reforms would have never happened.
This does not mean that, within the current legal framework, presidents cannot progress and expand their role. On the contrary, there is an expectation for the president to take a more proactive stance, particularly in the context of diplomatic missions beyond our borders.
For a nation state the size of Malta, fostering visibility internationally is crucial, encompassing aspects of foreign policy, commerce and the overall reputation of the country.
Another critical area that demands the president’s increased attention and vigilance is definitely ‘judicial discipline’.
On the contrary, it is imperative that the president possesses a certain level of political experience.
The notion that individuals engaged in politics are somehow unsuitable for any other public office is misguided and lacks rationale.
It is worth emphasising that most presidents, despite their political backgrounds, assumed their roles with a commitment to fulfilling their duties and unifying the nation in the best possible manner. In my humble opinion, the president should not be a prime minister in office. A lesson should be drawn from the mistake made in 2004.
It is imperative that the president possesses a certain level of political experience- Edward Zammit Lewis
While I take pride in the 2020 achievements, it remains crucial not to underscore the importance of having an ‘anti-deadlock mechanism’. The prevailing political circumstances, both domestically and internationally at that time, did not permit extended negotiations on the reforms.
The Venice Commission’s report, dated June 19, 2020, serves as a testament to the challenges faced during that period and my earnest efforts to propose a solution:
“89. In its Comments, the Government proposes that the president be elected and removed by a qualified majority of two-thirds in the House of Representatives. However, the majority required for election would decrease to a simple majority if a two-thirds majority could not be obtained. The majority for removal of the president would remain two-thirds in all cases.
“90. The Commission welcomes this proposal, especially that for removal of the president the two-thirds majority cannot be lowered. An anti-deadlock mechanism for the election of the president is indeed necessary. However, decreasing the majority required from two-thirds to a simple majority in one step might make it too easy for the majority to overcome this limitation. The decreasing majorities could be staggered. It would be important to leave sufficient time between the votes to allow the parties to come to an agreement on an acceptable candidate.
“91. In his letter of June 17, the minister proposed improving the anti-deadlock mechanism to have another vote requiring a two-thirds majority, not earlier than seven days from a failed first vote. Ahead of the vote, it would be possible for new candidates to be proposed. Failing the second vote, the House of Representative would take a third vote, not earlier than seven days from the second vote, where a [‘simple’] majority of all members of the House would suffice. In the view of the Commission, this is an improvement of the procedure of election of the president.”
During that period, the opposition expressed resistance to the above proposal. The Italian system, which aligns with our own in the appointment of a president, also incorporates such a provision. In this model, the president of the Camera Dei Deputati oversees the election, where representatives from the Chamber, the Senate and regional representatives cast their votes.
If a two-thirds majority is not achieved after three attempts, a simple majority is used. The system I advocated for in 2020 remains pertinent today, as its structure promotes agreement and consensus. It is imperative, however, to ensure that the two-thirds majority is not exploited as a tool of ‘political extortion’ by the opposition.
I maintain a positive outlook that, together, we can establish an effective anti-deadlock mechanism and identify an individual capable of uniting the nation, particularly someone who can proficiently fulfil the responsibilities of the president in the upcoming months.
The collective efforts in 2020 resulted in the appointment of Chief Justice Mark Chetcuti, even in the absence of a political or constitutional obligation to do so. I am confident that we can achieve a similar outcome through sensible efforts once again.
Edward Zammit Lewis is a former Labour cabinet minister.