The coming year will be one of the toughest for the EU. A new chancellor will be leading the most influential country, Germany, that for long has been the pacesetter in EU politics. France may have a new president. Italian politics remains unpredictable and a general election in 2022 may lead to another fragile coalition.
The geopolitical backdrop is far from encouraging. The Aukus deal between Australia, the UK and the US might lead to a new Anglosphere that will only add to the creeping insignificance of the EU in economic and geopolitical affairs.
There is no shortage of rhetoric about how the EU can underpin its sovereignty, achieve strategic autonomy and build a European army to assert its clout in global politics. At this point, one could be right in arguing that the political rhetoric on how to reinforce the EU’s credibility is more about wishful thinking and fantasy than reality.
The obstacles to the EU’s strengthening its credibility is the limited spending power of the member states, their failure to have a shared future about the future of the Union and the complex governance structures that keep the 27 member states in a loose union.
The strategic autonomy of the EU is an objective worth pursuing. The weakening of the strong ties the US had with Europe is almost irreversible. It will become even more so if former president Donald Trump wins the next US presidential election. But even President Joe Biden is not so interested in forging a more meaningful alliance on economic and defence issues with Europe.
Many political analysts argue that the EU can only be considered a world force in trade and defence if it fills the gap left by the US declining interest in geopolitical affairs. This means building a European army.
So far, only French President Emmanuel Macron has shown a keen interest in promoting this idea. The new German coalition may begin to show interest as the most significant geopolitical threat for the EU could arguably come from its eastern frontier.
Economic growth in the EU remains anaemic. Few member states would be willing to dedicate more of their GDP to build an army with enough resources to command respect for its ability to defend the Union.
The dependence on NATO that now has to deal with the US de facto withdrawal is no longer feasible.
The EU is bereft of quality leadership in most of its institutors. The complex governance structures lead to inertia and an absence of a sense of urgency to make the EU a tremendous political and economic force respected globally
But the real obstacle to building up the defence capabilities of the EU has more to do with the absence of an underlying vision to underpin an actual defence merger. Whenever a major international crisis erupted in the last few years, the member states could rarely act coherently and in unison.
In 2011, during the Libya crisis, Britain and France took part in the military intervention to overthrow Gaddafi. Germany just stood aside. When the US decided to invade Iraq in 2003, Germany and France joined Russia in opposing the invasion. Other member states, including Spain, the Netherlands, and Italy, supported the invasion.
As long as the EU does not speak with one voice in international fora, like the United Nations, it will be perceived as a loose union of countries whose primary interest is to trade freely across the Union’s borders. This is not what being a global power is about.
Even on relatively less complex projects that would enhance unity, progress has stalled.
The Banking Union that was conceived after the 2007 financial crisis is still a half-baked project. A common capital market remains a desirable objective that is nowhere near being achieved because of the conflicting interests of the different member states.
We have to see whether the new German leadership will be able to promote more unity in the EU in the post-Merkel era. Inertia would probably persist as long as no significant crisis erupts that poses an existential threat to the EU. This could take the form of serious political incidents on the eastern border of the EU. More likely, it could be the return of Trump to the White House that could mean another cold war between the two blocs on either side of the Atlantic.
The EU is bereft of quality leadership in most of its institutors. The complex governance structures lead to inertia and an absence of a sense of urgency to make the EU a tremendous political and economic force respected globally.
These weaknesses make the EU a loose conglomeration whose primary interest is not to be a global force but to trade among themselves.