It probably never crossed Magistrate Nadine Lia’s mind to make it a point to not annoy her father-in-law when she handled the Pilatus Bank case, much less discuss the matter with him.

The same can be said about her inlaw, lawyer Paul Lia, who is widely known to be close to the Labour Party.

He is an outspoken character; one knows exactly where one stands with him.

But this does not mean he would expect a member of the judiciary to do him any favours simply because of familial ties.

She repeatedly refused to recuse herself from the case, possibly determined not to allow the parties to a case to determine who should judge them.

However, the magistrate made one big mistake when she failed to realise that Repubblika, the civil society group that requested the recusal, genuinely saw a clear and present danger of not obtaining a fair judgment from her.

The constitutional court has long set the principle that the judiciary must step down not only because of reasons listed at law but also whenever their fairness, independence and impartiality appear open to reasonable doubt.

This was manifestly the case, as Mr Justice Ian Spiteri Bailey, sitting in the First Hall, Civil Court in its constitutional jurisdiction, ruled last week.

Deciding that the case should be heard by a different magistrate, the judge commented that “this [partial] judgment is necessary to ensure that, in challenge proceedings, justice is not only done but also seen to be done. In the opinion of the court, it is also necessary to protect, in the best possible way, the confidence our courts should enjoy in a democratic society”.

This unnecessary ‘dispute’ has already gone one legal stage too far. Had she recused herself when asked to, the magistrate would have avoided the constitutional court’s comment implying that a fellow member of the judiciary was failing to uphold the interests of justice.

Now, the state advocate’s decision to appeal is unnecessarily taking the matter even further with all the unsavoury consequences that could ensue. The judge’s pronouncement may well be legally overturned but morally it cannot be reversed. If the appeal goes in favour of the magistrate it will inevitably lead to more loss of faith in the justice system.

This apart from the fact that, in the circumstances, the magistrate would be put in a spot when it comes to making her final decision. If, on the other hand, the constitutional court’s decision was to stand, it would be another black mark on the magistrate’s performance sheet.

Even at this stage, the question of whether the magistrate can remain in office is a legitimate one to ask. Much depends on how she behaves when faced with similar reasonable requests in the future. Appeals from judgments by magistrates are filed on a regular basis.

The fact that Lia’s decision not to recuse herself has been changed by a judge is not earth-shattering and should not, at least on paper, reflect badly on her overall competence as a member of the judiciary – except that it brought out an inappropriate sense of stubbornness.

It ought to be borne in mind that the same magistrate had previously recused herself in the best interests of justice, so why not this time too?

The decision by the constitutional court has put Lia on thin ice, irrespective of the outcome of any appeal. Maintaining confidence in the legal system should now be a paramount consideration, as suggested by the constitutional court itself.