Corruption in the public sector imposes a steep cost on society, easily dwarfing that of ordinary crime committed on our streets. Yet, embedded corrupt practices in public sector organisations are increasingly being taken for granted and tolerated by many. This is a sure way for corruption to be perpetuated. Political leaders need to identify the processes that reinforce the normalisation of corruption.
Times of Malta’s insistence on publishing reports on the controversial Montenegro wind farm project has finally led to the release of documents showing the severe failure of good governance at Enemalta. Times of Malta and Reuters had previously uncovered how Yorgen Fenech secretly profited from the 2015 deal via 17 Black, the same company set to transfer millions to Keith Schembri, former chief of staff at the OPM, and then-minister Konrad Mizzi.
The internal Enemalta review by law firm Mamo-TCV lists several gross mismanagement practices that will undoubtedly continue eroding the public’s trust in the country’s administration. It is not surprising that Mizzi was the brains behind this project. The incestuous relationship between rogue politicians and corrupt business people has often led to state capture in the last few years, depriving ordinary citizens of the right to be governed well by their political leaders.
The report gives mild praise to the Enemalta board of directors for not implementing the project ‘blindly’, but correctly criticised board members, most of whom were party loyalists, for failing to scrutinise thoroughly the projects they were asked to approve.
This may have been the result of incompetence in evaluating technical projects. More likely, it was the result of ‘social cocooning’. In the context of Enemalta, the notion of a social cocoon describes how newcomers in the organisation’s decision-making roles are expected to perform and accept covert corrupt practices.
They almost invariably lose their independence of thought and succumb to political pressure. The concealment of corruption is hidden from the outside world. This process prevents the cocoon’s rationalisation from being subject to a reality check through public exposure. This vicious circle leads to decision-makers accepting and engaging in behaviour they would otherwise have found objectionable.
The report also reveals how Enemata’s top brass tried to rationalise the severe shortcomings in their management processes. The lack of sufficient information given to the board members about the conflict of interest of the players in the project prevented them from questioning the links between the project’s protagonists.
Put simply, the board approved this project without a proper, robust due diligence process.
The purging of internal e-mails that could have thrown light on who was accountable for particular decisions was justified by Enemalta on the argument that it is standard practice that the contents of e-mail boxes are “discarded after six months of an employee leaving”. The reporting law firm could not conduct electronic searches on Enemalta’s computers.
Like many recent cases of suspected corruption, it might be challenging to find sufficient evidence acceptable to a criminal court to prosecute those who participated in this disgraceful project. But Enemalta’s governance, like that of many state-controlled organisations, is undoubtedly not fit for purpose.
Governance failures must not be considered normal and unavoidable in a democratic society where most citizens pay taxes and expect decent public services. Only the prime minister’s steely political will to reform governance processes can prevent the normalisation of corruption.