As Europe is facing its gravest security crisis since WWII, there is a new urgency for the EU to adjust to new geopolitical realities and accelerate the transformation of its foreign policy.
In spite of repeated attempts to revamp its foreign and security policy, EU decision-making in the area of foreign policy remains slow and timid and often hampered by internal divisions.
This perception persists among most Europeans and the recently concluded conference on the future of Europe, in its recommendations published on May 9, called on the EU to improve its capacity to take speedy and effective decisions, to speak with one voice and to act as a truly global player, projecting a positive role in the world and making a difference in response to crises.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine brought war to the EU’s doorstep and presents a threat to European security as a whole. This seems to have shaken the EU out of its slumber and its response to Russian aggression has, so far, been united and determined.
The 27 member states reacted quickly as a bloc by levying against Russia the strongest sanctions in the EU’s history and by rushing direct military assistance to the beleaguered country.
As images of devastated Ukrainian cities and reports of atrocities flowed in, the EU and its member states immediately took decisions that, under normal circumstances, would have taken months to reach and would have provoked strong opposition from some members.
In addition to five packages of sanctions intended to weaken Russia’s economic base and curtail its ability to wage war, the EU took the unprecedented decision to deliver lethal weapons within a €1.5 billion package of assistance to the Ukrainian military under its European Peace Facility. It triggered, also for the first time, the 2001 temporary protection mechanism to grant temporary residence to Ukrainian refugees and earmarked €17 billion to support member states hosting refugees.
The EU also provided humanitarian aid to Ukraine and Moldova, material assistance to Ukraine and neighbouring countries under its civil protection mechanism and €1.2 billion in macro-financial assistance to foster stability.
The European Commission is proposing an additional €9 billion to support the Ukrainian government and is already planning for reconstruction.
Russian threats to Europe gave rise to so far unmatched cooperation in the area of defence. EU leaders meeting in Versailles on March 11 – 12, agreed that they “must resolutely invest more and better in defence capabilities and innovative technologies”.
In response, the commission last week submitted proposals to be discussed at the upcoming special European Council on May 30 – 31 for the joint procurement of military equipment, for increased defence spending to fill in urgent capability shortfalls and for strengthening European defence industrial base.
The European Union needs to carve for itself a compelling role as ‘a hard power’- Edward Zammit Lewis
The war has completely changed the EU approach to security and defence and persuaded reluctant member states to stop putting the brakes on further European defence integration. This change is reflected in the EU Strategic Compass that was adopted on March 21. It provides a more realistic shared threats analysis than previous documents defining strategies for the EU’s foreign and security policy. It expands the EU military toolbox and provides for more flexible decision-making in this area to make it easier for coalitions of willing member states to conduct operations within the EU framework.
However, behind this show of unity and decisiveness when faced with a major crisis, there lurks the uncomfortable truth that the EU still lacks the will and readiness to advance to deeper integration and cohesion in its foreign, security and defence policy. The war in Ukraine surely motivated the EU to surpass a number of shortcomings but it still has to overcome several thorny issues if it wants to develop a more effective foreign policy that will last beyond the current crisis.
The fear is that, with the prolongation of the war, this sudden surge of unity among the 27 member states may begin to wear out, especially if tougher decisions are needed that call for more sacrificing of the national interest and constitutional neutrality. The current lack of agreement on a sixth package of sanctions, which includes an embargo on Russian oil, is a case in point.
The union needs to carve for itself a compelling role as ‘a hard power’ in addition to its current significant economic weight and ‘soft power’. Acting in crisis mode in response to Russian aggression, the EU quickly decided to provide lethal weapons to Ukraine and to levy tough sanctions on Russia. However, as part of its future defence policy, it needs to establish clearer policies and stronger safeguards for the provision of military aid to third countries.
It also needs to establish a long-term strategy for the large-scale use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy instrument, especially to mitigate as much as possible trade disruption, the impact on energy and commodity prices and the overall global fallout.
These are the challenges facing the union in the months to come and Malta must prepare itself well to have its say on these crucial issues determining the long-term direction and future of the EU.
Edward Zammit Lewis, Labour MP