Political analysts often interpret recent election results with a “recency bias” – the tendency to give more weight to things that have just happened. In the last several months, many have given their interpretation of the decline of mainstream political parties of the centre-left and centre-right in Germany and France. They will do the same when the results of the Italian elections are announced after the September 25 election.
To understand the decline of mainstream political parties, one needs to look further back on developments, especially in the last five decades, that could explain why traditional political parties face such formidable challenges.
Political analysts often perceived centre-right European political parties as dull but stable and dependable. Europe’s centre-right has three families – the Christian democratic, the conservative and the market liberal. All three families are going through a transformation to try and remain relevant in political life.
On the other side of the Atlantic, Donald Trump has arguably moulded what was once a centre-right Republican Party into a populist radical-right force that even approved the storming of the Capitol. The European centre-right frets about the risks of adopting the US Republicans’ model that many understandably considered a threat to liberal democracy.
The mainstream right is not a homogenous block. The Christian democrats, like the CDU/CSU in Germany, are supporters of European integration, class compromise, accommodation of pluralism and the development of a reasonably comprehensive welfare regime.
The centre-right conservative wing, like the UK Conservative Party, is less keen to promote the welfare state. They take a more nationalistic line and are generally more eurosceptic.
The liberals, such as Venstre in Denmark, are more internationalist and more concerned with promoting and protecting pluralism and individual rights rather than preserving traditional values.
So the challenges facing the European centre-right are diverse and can best be addressed by understanding what has changed in prevalent social sensitivities in the last five decades.
In the three decades after World War II, strong economic growth permitted the emergence of a robust middle class that began to worry less about material needs and started to care more about post-material concerns. Political scientists have labelled this major force of change in moulding popular political preferences as the “silent revolution”.
This was not a revolution in the literal sense of the word. It was an evolution that first affected the younger generations who cared about issues such as fair trade, international peace, respect for the environment and women’s rights. More people in Europe adopted cosmopolitan, progressive-individualist values and shunned traditional and sometimes nationalistic and authoritarian values. This trend helped the growth of green and new left parties.
On the other side of the Atlantic, Donald Trump has arguably moulded what was once a centre-right Republican Party into a populist radical-right force that even approved the storming of the Capitol
In the last two decades, a silent counter-revolution emerged as a backlash against the value shift of the previous three decades. Many Europeans blamed progressive values like multiculturalism and immigration for the social and economic problems created by globalisation that mainstream parties failed to address.
Populist parties of the radical right exploited this sense of unease in many voters and scored impressive electoral victories in practically all European countries. Italy may soon be the first European country ruled by a right-wing coalition led by two populist parties.
To regain some of their former relevance, the centre-left and the centre-right need to be a broad church for European voters. The traditional centre-right is experiencing conflicting tensions. On the one hand, it continues to appeal to well-heeled and often well-educated voters, many of whom embrace liberal and progressive values.
On the other hand, they need to appeal to often less-educated and less affluent voters who sympathise with the authoritarian and anti-immigrant rhetoric that has made populist far-right parties so successful in the last two decades.
The Conservative family of the centre-right struggle to promote the need to open the economy to immigrants as this could positively affect the free market system. Still, they fear the potential conflict this could create with their belief in national sovereignty.
Western European societies have become more liberal on issues such as abortion, divorce, gay rights and gender equality. Some Christian democrats have found this change in popular attitudes to social values difficult to accept. This explains why conservatives and Christian democratic parties have struggled more than the liberal parties of the centre-right to retain popular support.
In a less religious European society, the biggest challenge for centre-right parties, especially the Christian democratic faction, is to deal with rising nationalism, xenophobia and antipathy to immigration that go against the traditional values that Christian democracy has always championed.
Next week’s article will discuss the future of European social democracy.