Who were the spies that aided Bonaparte and were ready to continue furnishing him with a helping hand? Bonaparte obtained very useful information from some French knights who were ready to betray their Order in favour of their country of origin.

General Claude-Henri Belgrand de Vaubois (1748-1839), one of Bonaparte’s generals, whose brother was a conventual chaplain of the Order of St John, who corroborated with the French invaders. Vaubois led one of the invading French forces and was installed as military governor of the islands. Photo: en.wikipdia.orgGeneral Claude-Henri Belgrand de Vaubois (1748-1839), one of Bonaparte’s generals, whose brother was a conventual chaplain of the Order of St John, who corroborated with the French invaders. Vaubois led one of the invading French forces and was installed as military governor of the islands. Photo: en.wikipdia.org

In his manuscript housed at the National Library of Malta, Bailiff de la Tour du Pin mentions a number of them: Commander Bosredon Ransijat (1743-1812), secretary of the Order’s Treasury; Commander Jean Charles de Fay, director of fortifications and water cisterns; Commander Antoine François Renè Bardonenche, a native of Grenoble in command of the artillery; Stephen Toussard, a servant-at-arms who was the Order’s chief engineer; Lascaris, a knight; and a number of conventual chaplains that included Breuvart, Frin, David Beaufort, Libreri and Richard Belgrand, the brother of Charles-Henri Belgrand de Vaubois, one of Bonaparte’s generals.

These collaborators are said to have held their meetings in the Jacobin Club at the premises of the Lija residence of Bosredon Ransijat or in his apartments at the Treasury. A cursory look at the important posts held by these members of the Order is enough to realise the amount of information and practical help they could have passed on to Bonaparte, especially when keeping in mind that Fay, Bardonenche and Toussard were members of the Order’s Congregation of War.

Olive Doublet (1749-1824), the grand master’s secretary. He always maintained that he had remained loyal to the Order of St John and wrote a book to exculpate himself. Photo: J. Scicluna (Translator), Malta Surrendered, 2011.Olive Doublet (1749-1824), the grand master’s secretary. He always maintained that he had remained loyal to the Order of St John and wrote a book to exculpate himself. Photo: J. Scicluna (Translator), Malta Surrendered, 2011.

It is also said that the conspirators included the grand master’s secretary, Ovide Doublet, who however always maintained his loyalty to the Order and even wrote a book to defend himself. Very probably, these meetings centred round the French consul in Malta, the already-mentioned Caruson.

But there was another pro-French faction that was made up of Maltese. Originally, this ‘club’ had been set up to consider how the Maltese could be admitted to full membership of the Order of St John and not only as donats or conventual chaplains, but ended up by opposing the Knights, with a number of them being implicated in a 1797 plot – whose aims have remained hazy, to say the least, since the report of the court proceedings have apparently been burnt – in which a number of knights were seemingly involved.

The plot did, however, include the theft of arms and ammunition from the armoury at Qormi (now the police station) with the connivance of the custodian Michele Balzan who, in fact, was exiled for life. Other exiled plotters included Vincenzo Barbara, Salvatore Schembri and Saverio Troisi for life; Thomas Zammit and Giuseppe Micallef for 10 years; Gio. Batta Triganza and Salvatore Bartolo for two years; and Calcedonio Xuereb and Angelo Bartolo for one year. Almost all of them returned to Malta with the invading French army in June 1798.

The scholar Michael Anthony Vassalli was initially sentenced to death because he was said to have been the principal capo della machinata sedizione; but is it true that it was commuted to life imprisonment at Fort Ricasoli after apparently divulging the names of the conspirators, or was he actually threatened with death if he dared to reveal the name of Hompesch?

Michael Anthony Vassalli (1764-1829). At the arrival of the French in 1798, he was in prison for his part in an anti-Knights plot. He was a Francophile and left Malta with the French when they were ousted in 1800. Photo: en.wikipedia.orgMichael Anthony Vassalli (1764-1829). At the arrival of the French in 1798, he was in prison for his part in an anti-Knights plot. He was a Francophile and left Malta with the French when they were ousted in 1800. Photo: en.wikipedia.org

In the unpublished notes of the historian Mgr Fortunato Panzavecchia (1797-1850), there is an allegation that (the future Grand Master) Hompesch was a member of the Jacobin Club and that he had planned the 1797 plot. For unknown reasons, Panzavecchia did not repeat this allegation when he published his book about the last years of the Order in Malta.

Although Vassalli was accused as being the ringleader, the presumed leader of the plot was Fra Domenico Bonavita, who managed to escape. To these above-mentioned unfortunate men, one has to add some members of the Maltese aristocracy, who included Baron Camillo Sceberras, Baron Giovanni Francesco Dorel, Camillo Testaferrata and Baron Paolo Parisio.

Here it is pertinent to distinguish the aims behind the two factions of collaborators. The members of the Order of St John were, to put it simply, no better than traitors. They were actually betraying their own Order to whom they had sworn oaths of obedience and allegiance. But the charge of betrayal cannot be placed at the door of the Maltese collaborators because they were not members of the Order and they were only carrying out their actions because they thought and believed – misguidedly maybe, but this is a moot point that one can debate ad infinitum – that they were acting in the best interests of their homeland.

Bonaparte obtained very useful information from some French knights who were ready to betray their Order

Mgr Fortunato Panzavecchia (1797-1850). He wrote down certain allegations in his notes but omitted them when he published his book about the last days of the Order in Malta. Photo: Courtesy of David Agius Muscat, il-Kanonku Fortunato Panzavecchia 1797-1850 – Raġel ta’ Kultura u Qaddej tal-Patrija, Horizons, 2019Mgr Fortunato Panzavecchia (1797-1850). He wrote down certain allegations in his notes but omitted them when he published his book about the last days of the Order in Malta. Photo: Courtesy of David Agius Muscat, il-Kanonku Fortunato Panzavecchia 1797-1850 – Raġel ta’ Kultura u Qaddej tal-Patrija, Horizons, 2019

Bonaparte was certain that Malta could be captured through a sudden attack, a coup de main, on the lines that he had stated in his letters. The French fleet, under the command of Admiral Brueys, had been at Corfù since September 1797 and, in November, Bonaparte wrote to him stating that he was sending him 1,600 men so that he would have 3,000 soldiers available for what he termed the petite expedition, by which he meant the occupation of Malta.

Brueys answered in December through a letter in which he stated that Vincenzo Barbara had been sent to Malta (secretly, no doubt) and that his fleet was in need of a lot of material. By February 1798, Brueys had given up hope that he would receive the provisions that he lacked, so he led his fleet out of Corfù on February 24 and arrived off Malta on March 3, 1798. He had in mind that, if circumstances were favourable, he would enter Malta and capture the islands. When the French fleet was reported to be approaching Malta on March 2, orders were issued for the manning of all the defensive posts of the islands, with the result that when Brueys arrived on the next day, he found the islands prepared to repel any possible assault.

Camillo Sceberras (1772-1855): a Francophile who left Malta with the French when they were ousted in 1800. Photo: Heritage, vol. 1, issue 3, courtesy of Dr H. GanadoCamillo Sceberras (1772-1855): a Francophile who left Malta with the French when they were ousted in 1800. Photo: Heritage, vol. 1, issue 3, courtesy of Dr H. Ganado

Under these circumstances, Brueys could not risk ordering an attack, so he sent two vessels to the Maltese port for some urgent repairs together with a letter of explanation to the French consul, Jean Andrè Caruson.

Under his command, Brueys had a fleet consisting of 11 ships-of-the-line, six frigates and two chebecs, some of which had been captured from Venice and were in bad condition with regard to their crews and equipment, including the fact that they had leakage problems and were not fully seaworthy.

Therefore, Brueys did not even dare attempt to force an entry into Grand Harbour so that no one would even imagine that he was impinging on the Order’s neutrality.

After repairs had been carried out on the two vessels, one of which was the former Venetian ship Frontin and the other was a chebec, Brueys despatched a letter of thanks to Grand Master Hompesch and sailed to Toulon. On March 11, 1798, Brueys wrote a letter to Bonaparte describing what had occurred and assured him that no action on his part could be interpreted that a French attack would take place in the future. The French fleet arrived at Toulon on April 2, 1798.

Vice-Admiral François-Paul Brueys d’Aigalliers (1753-98). He did not dare attempt to invade Malta with his fleet in March 1798. Photo: en.wikipedia.orgVice-Admiral François-Paul Brueys d’Aigalliers (1753-98). He did not dare attempt to invade Malta with his fleet in March 1798. Photo: en.wikipedia.org

In early 1798, French troops occupied Switzerland and the Papal States for economic reasons. In March 1798, the Executive Directory decided to abandon a proposed invasion of Britain and authorised an expedition to Egypt in its stead. Bonaparte discussed his plans with the Executive Directory and emphasised that the following military troops were essential for the success of the expedition against Malta and Egypt: between 20,000 and 30,000 infantry, and between 2,000 and 3,000 cavalry. They could be embarked from Civitavecchia, Genoa, Corsica and Toulon. On board, the naval transports would need to have provisions for two months and a water supply for a month.

On April 12, 1798, the French government approved a number of resolutions, two of which related to Malta: “That the Commander of the Army of the East was authorised to capture the island of Malta. He was to proceed immediately with the military and naval forces under his command to the island of Malta.”

“The order of the day addressed to General Bonaparte, Commander of the Army of the East, instructs him to capture the island of Malta, which should not be carried out if such an action is prejudicial to the success of the other operations that have been entrusted to him. On this point, the Directory relies completely on his judgement.” These orders were as clear as crystal: Malta was to be occupied by the French but this invasion was not the principal aim of the expedition. The main target was not just Egypt. With Egypt as a base, the plans included the exclusion of the British from the lands bordering the Red Sea, the cutting of a canal to join the Mediterranean and the Red Seas, and that the Red Sea would be under the exclusive influence of the French Republic. All this is clear in the other orders despatched by the French government to Bonaparte on the same day. It was a very ambitious plan to shatter British strength and influence in the East. The occupation of Malta was part of the overall plan.

Dr Grima is author of Malta u Franza 1798-1800, Malta, 2006.

(Concluded)

Joseph F. Grima, Retired casual history lecturer and Asst Director of Education

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