Stop the rot

Social protection programmes channel a large amount of public resources, providing opportunities and incentives for corrupt and fraudulent practices. Integrity challenges in social security systems involve corruption in defining eligibility and enrolling beneficiaries, collusion, political patronage and clientelism, conflicts of interest, corruption in pension investment funds and fraud.

We had a clear example of the above scenario when it was revealed that former Labour MP Silvio Grixti was implicated in a scandal that allegedly enabled hundreds of people to receive disability benefits to which they were not entitled. The social security disability programme was meant to be a lifeline for the severely disabled but shameless con artists were increasingly seeing it as a way to buy votes and make easy money, thinking that no one was watching.

We must defeat any possibility for politicians and parties to design policies aimed at benefitting selective groups with a range of patronage-oriented practices.

It is time to consider introducing mechanisms that can successfully combat the prevalence of error, fraud and corruption within our social security network. We need to develop good governance guidelines that provide a broad framework for anti-corruption activities, framed around principles of accountability, transparency, predictability, participation and dynamism. 

A number of tools can also be implemented by various programmes, such as hotlines and portals to report abuse, random sample spot checks, information campaigns and training and data matching. We must identify the drivers of fraud and corruption challenges in social security services.

There are a number of contextual factors that can provide fertile ground for corruption. The intensity of corruption risks varies greatly depending on circumstances and our country’s legal and institutional frameworks. Generally, I contend that corruption risks in our social security services are due to procedural weaknesses in grant administration and systemic weaknesses, such as ill-functioning audit systems, weak capacity, oversight and controls, inadequate training and the relatively low pay of social protection workers.

As it is, the design of our social security set-up leaves room for the government’s undue interference in the management and decisions within the system. This is especially true since the department does not enjoy budgetary independence. In such a situation, there is a risk that financial decisions are taken for political or strategic goals other than managing risks and maximising the net return, as the government is in a better position to coerce the board or governing body to follow its directives.

We must defeat any possibility for politicians and parties to design policies aimed at benefitting selective groups with a range of patronage-oriented practices, including log-rolling, constituency service and intensive interest group involvement in policymaking, whereby politicians offer benefits to selective groups of voters in return for their votes.

Mark Said  – Msida