Wednesday, June 6, 1798: A fleet of warships and transports was sighted sailing to Malta. It was the French squadron and military contingent that had sailed from Civitavecchia but, failing to rendezvous with the rest of the French armada, had arrived off Malta prematurely. The commander of this contingent, General Louis Desaix, sent assurances to the Order that his fleet was on its way to Egypt but that he would like to take some provisions and water aboard. Permission was granted and the ships then sailed away from the island until the rest of the French armada arrived. The next day was the feast of Corpus Christi.

Saturday morning, June 9: A very large number of vessels – warships and transports – approached Malta from the direction of Gozo, flying the flag of France, under the supreme command of General Napoleon Bonaparte. Grand Master Ferdinand Hompesch hoped that this formidable fleet was on its way to Egypt, as Desaix had assured him three days previously. This hope took a concrete form when the French allowed the entry into Grand Harbour of two warships of the Order escorting two merchantmen laden with corn from Sicily.

Bonaparte then despatched a letter to the French Consul, Jean Andrè Caruson, so that he would, in his name, request the Order’s permission to allow the French fleet enter the harbours to take on water supplies, although he knew that the Knights couldn’t comply with his request.

Hompesch summoned the Order’s Council and it was almost unanimously agreed to refuse Bonaparte’s request. Caruson was sent back to Bonaparte, aboard the ship-of-the-line L’Orient, with a verbal answer on these lines: in accordance with the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713, in the case of war being waged between European countries, no more than four warships at a time by a belligerent state were allowed to enter the Maltese harbour.

This answer provided Bonaparte with a pretext/excuse to order the army to land and invade the Maltese islands. He dictated an ultimatum to Hompesch, under the signature of Caruson, that was despatched the following morning when the landings were already taking place. Bonaparte wrote that it was impossible for a fleet made up of “500 to 600 vessels” to take water supplies four at a time, especially after “favours shown to the British”.

Caruson also wrote that Napoleon was not allowing him to return “to a city which henceforth he feels obliged to treat as belonging to an enemy”.

The Order of St John always had plans of defence in case of an invasion. These details were the province of the Congregation of War (or War Council) which, in this case, had drawn up its plans. Unfortunately, some members of this congregation were pro-French (Toussard, de Fay and de Bardonenche); others lacked military acumen: the Bailiffs Frisari and Sousa both lacked military talent; while the Bailiff Neveu was a drunkard; leaving only Bailiff de la Tour du Pin and Commander de Thuisi as the sole dependable and trustworthy members in the War Council.

The dispositions for the defence of the islands were as follows: the four cities and Floriana bordering Grand Harbour were collectively garrisoned with 24 companies of 150 soldiers each, a part of the Regiment of Malta, the Compagnia della Bolla (a ceremonial corps made up of Valletta tradesmen), and complements of sailors and marines who served on the naval ships.

The garrison commanders were Knight-Commander Gurn at Fort St Elmo; Grand Marshal Bailiff Abel de Loras at Valletta; Knight de Gournau at Fort St Angelo; Knight-Commander de Gondrecourt at Vittoriosa; Knight-commander Annibale de Soubiras – the captain-general of the Galleys – at Cospicua; Bailiff de Suffren de St Tropez at Senglea; Bailiff Toussaint de la Tour du Pin, helped by Knight-Commander de Thiusi, at the encompassing Cottonera fortifications; and the Bailiff de Tillet at Fort Ricasoli.

The Light Infantry Regiment (Cacciatori Maltesi), commanded by Bailiff Neveu, had companies stationed at forts Tigné, Manoel and Ricasoli, together with other battalions. The Tigné commandant was Knight-Commander Reichberg, while bailiffs Gourgeau and La Tour Saint Quentin defended Fort Manoel.

Mdina was led by the Captain of the Rod (the so-called Ħakem) and the city jurats. Knight-Commander de Mesgrigny Ville Bertin commanded Gozo while Knight de Valin oversaw Comino.

The commanders of the coastal defences were: The Red Tower (St Agatha Tower) overlooking Mellieħa Bay – Knight St Simon; Mellieħa itself – Knight-Commander de Bizier; St Paul’s Bay – Knight de la Penouse; the adjacent bays of St Julian’s and St George – Knight de Preville; St Thomas Tower, the Tumbrell, Marsaxlokk and Fort St Lucian – Knight du Pin de la Gueriviere; Birżebbuġa – Knight-Commander de Rozan; the militia – Knight Prince Camille de Rohan assisted by bailiffs de Thenissey and Tommasi.

A number of these commanding officers were members of the Council of the Order that had refused Bonaparte’s request to water the fleet simultaneously. The defence plan was to repel French attempts to land and prevent them from gaining footholds on the islands. But this plan failed for three reasons:

1. The alarm was sounded too late because the Order was not immediately certain of the French intentions;

2. The coastal defences lacked the requisite number of defenders;

3. A number of the commanding officers betrayed the Order.

The plan to oppose the enemy landings was completely mistaken. It was crystal clear that the main defensive strength of the island was not the coast and shoreline defences that were only strong enough to repel enemy raids and small landings.

The best plan would have been to abandon the shore defences and retire behind the very strong defences encircling the harbours and fight for time until help would eventually arrive from a country at war with France. In fact, the British fleet under the command of Rear-Admiral Horatio Nelson was at the time scouring the Mediterranean searching for the French fleet.

In 1798, Great Britain was the only unsubdued country opposing France. They knew about the numerous French preparations in various European localities for invasion purposes but never realised that the projected aim was the occupation of Egypt. They rather feared that the objective could be Ireland or even England itself. There were also concerns that the French were preparing to occupy the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, apart from the false rumours purposely bandied about by French agents. The British Consul at Leghorn (Livorno) suspected that one of the French objectives was Malta, together with Egypt, but his letters to Lord Nelson were delayed.

Nelson and his fleet had left England on April 10 and arrived at Cadiz at the end of the month. Nelson had been ordered to sail into the Mediterranean to discover the intentions of the French. Bad weather greatly hampered Nelson’s movements and, conversely, favoured the French. When the British were informed that the French had captured Malta, it was too late to intervene because Bonaparte had already left the islands. Judging from the prevailing winds, Nelson concluded that the French had sailed to Egypt and he went in that direction. Again, he did not find the French fleet because, ironically, the British arrived at Alexandria before the French.

The French plan of invasion was to land contingents of troops at four different localities: at Gozo under General Ebenezer Reynier; at St Paul’s Bay and its precincts under General Louis Baraguey d’Hilliers; at St Julian’s Bay and the surrounding area under General Charles-Henri Vaubois; at St Thomas Bay and Wied ix-Xoqqa near Birżebbuġa under General Louis Desaix. Each one of these four contingents had specific objectives so that, collectively, they would ensure that the Maltese and Gozitan countryside would be captured within a short time.

The plan for Gozo was simple: a landing at Ramla l-Ħamra bay with the troops spreading out in the area between Fort Chambray and the Citadel overlooking Victoria. After landing, the St Paul’s Bay troops were to advance on Madliena and Mdina. Vaubois’s task, with Colonel Auguste Marmont and General Jean Lannes in his contingent, was more complex: he had to overcome the batteries at the Madliena inlet and Qalet Marku, blockade Valletta and Floriana, occupy the countryside between Qormi and Casal Paola to affect a junction with Desaix’s troops, blockade forts Manoel and Tigné and spread out in the direction of Mdina to meet up with the columns of Baraguey d’Hilliers.

Desaix was charged with occupying Marsaxlokk Bay and advancing on the Cottonera Lines with the hope that he would be able to take over a part of the fortifications or one of its gates. If this plan failed, Desaix’s troops were to invest Fort Ricasoli and spread out in the direction of Marsa to join part of Vaubois’s forces. The plan also called for the general headquarters of these land forces to be located in the village of Għargħur. The fleet was to assist all the landings and four large ships-of-the-line were to blockade the two main ports, Grand Harbour and Marsamxett Harbour.

On the whole, the French plan was carried out on Sunday, June 10. Generally speaking, the French landed with ease because, on a number of occasions, they were helped by traitorous knights who did their best to facilitate the landings: some commanders openly crossed over to the enemy; cannon balls and guns placed near each other were of different calibres; inferior ammunition was distributed to the troops; and other acts of sabotage. This confounded the Maltese troops and created confusion, with the soldiers not knowing who was trustworthy or not. However, not all the knights betrayed their Order and some of them were blamed for no reason at all.

Reports sent in by the French commanders make interesting reading. On June 11 and 13, General Jean Louis Ebenezer Reynier reported that there were about 2,300 defenders and the landing was effected between Ramla l-Ħamra and Irdum il-Kbir.

Due to preparation time and a contrary breeze, the attack could not take place before 1pm. The French encountered stiff opposition from musket fire from the cliff, the batteries of Ramla l-Ħamra and Sopu Tower; however, the French troops were aided by the ships that successfully bombarded the land defences. The landing cost some lives.

From Ramla l-Ħamra, the French advanced through Nadur to Fort Chambray, which quickly surrendered. The troops then advanced on Rabat through Xagħra and occupied all these positions by nightfall. The French captured a total of 116 guns from the Citadel, Fort Chambray and the other towers and batteries together with a quantity of muskets and three depots with stored grain.

The landing at St Paul’s Bay and its surrounding area was successful. General Louis Baraguey d’Hilliers reported the capture of all the enemy forts, batteries and defensive positions without losing any French lives. About 50 guns were captured, together with 150 prisoners, for the loss of one knight and a soldier. Therefore, the whole countryside in the north of Malta was in French hands who now had a clear passage to advance on Mdina.

But the fulcrum of the French operations really centred on the contingent led by General Claude-Henri Belgrand de Vaubois. The landings started at 4am and were successfully carried out with immediate effect mainly through the help afforded by traitor knights who not only forbade their men to fire on the invaders but some of them openly crossed over to the French, leaving their perplexed men undecided what to do next. Therefore, there was very little opposition to the landings at St Julian’s and St George’s bays.

The landings were successfully carried out with immediate effect mainly through the help afforded by traitor knights

Actually, there was no dearth of troops in the area – 60 Maltese soldiers from the Light Infantry (Cacciatori) and 1,200 men from the Birkirkara regiment of the militia – but each one of these men had been issued with only a musket, a bayonet and three rounds of ammunition. The St Julian’s battery guns did not even fire one round on the enemy.

At the Naxxar entrenchments, there were 400 mainly unarmed militiamen who had replaced the Naxxar regiment that was ordered to proceed to Mdina by the Grand Master, following the advice tendered by Toussard and Saint-Priest, two traitor knights. The men had to flee to Fort Manoel, Valletta or Mdina. Bailiff Giovanni Battista Tommasi tried to restore order and stem the panic but he himself had to retire to Valletta, with the few men at his disposal, to avoid being captured.

At Mdina, the people were panic-stricken. Accompanying the French, there was Vincenzo Barbara, who advised the Maltese to surrender because the fight was against the Order of St John and not against them.

An urgent meeting of the Mdina Universitas, also attended by Bishop Vincenzo Labini, decided to surrender the city on condition that respect would be shown to the Church and the Catholic faith of the Maltese, together with the recognition of their privileges, laws and property. Bishop Labini then invited Vaubois and his officers to dine with him.

But Vaubois had not yet completed the military campaign he had been set. His troops failed to capture forts Tigné and Manoel due to determined defenders led by loyal and honest knights. These forts were surrounded together with the Floriana defences where stout resistance had also been offered.

A Maltese sortie was carried out from Porte des Bombes to repel a group of five French battalions led by Colonel Marmont. The French feigned retreat but led the Maltese into an ambush where they faced a barrage of musket fire and had to retreat behind the Floriana defences. Marmont himself captured a standard of the Order, a feat for which he was later promoted.

Desaix’s troops also landed successfully at Marsaxlokk despite resistance by the village militia and the Order’s cavalry but the defenders had to retreat to Fort Ricasoli and the Cottonera Lines. Fierce fighting took place near Delimara, and Fort St Lucian resisted till the ammunition supplies ran out. The defenders surrendered with the honours of war and were allowed to go to Cottonera.

Therefore, the French could make full use of all the bays in the locality and Desaix’s troops could link up with those of Vaubois. With the exception of the cities and fortresses of the two main harbours, Malta was in the hands of the French.

With the exception of the cities and fortresses of the two main harbours, Malta was in the hands of the French

Opposition by the Order’s naval forces was restricted to one particular action when a galley, two galeottes and a sloop, under Knight de Soubiras, sallied out of Grand Harbour to harass some French landing boats. Because of the lack of a wind, the French ships could not sail to defend the landing craft.

The Order’s craft manoeuvered with their oars and inflicted some damage on the French. However, a breeze then rose up and the French ships were able to sail close and defend their compatriots. The result was that De Soubiras and his small naval flotilla were forced to retreat back to Grand Harbour.

After the countryside was over-run, it seems that the French sacked and looted some localities. A relatione by the Rev. Ignatius Debono from Vittoriosa despatched to Mgr Giulio dei Conti Carpegna, the last Inquisitor of Malta, who had departed from the island before the French arrival, states that there was general looting, killing of farm animals and raping of women by the French at Naxxar, Birkirkara, Lija, Balzan and Qormi.

A few parish documents corroborate part of Debono’s writing because, at the Qormi parish archives, documents state that there was looting from private premises together with the sequestration of many gold and silver objects from the parish church of St George which was decorated for the octave of the Corpus Christi feast.

General sacking seems to have been rampant in the Żabbar area, but it also seems that, at other localities like Żebbuġ, the church treasures were left intact. Sacking and looting were common in Europe in wartime but it was an unexpected new experience for the Maltese.

In the cities there was confusion, with apparently no one knowing exactly what was happening outside the fortifications: news changed all the time while rumours were rife and multiplied every minute.

Before midday, the militia had already retreated behind the Floriana walls and this helped to add to the circulating rumours and to the general uncertainty prevalent everywhere.

The Maltese within the walls were anxious lest a full-scale bombardment would bury them in the ruins of their houses. Every action was exaggerated, especially when alleged sabotage was reported.

French agents withheld messages from the Palace and even prevented provisions from getting through to the defending soldiers. One has to add the distribution of bad ammunition and the withholding of good cartridges kept in the ammunition depots by Knight-Commander de Bardonenche and his clerk Gravagna, both collaborators of the French.

Many Maltese assumed that all the knights were traitors when this was not the case. A few French civilians residing at Valletta – notably Etienne Eynaud and François Damas – were attacked and killed, and assaults were carried out on some knights at Cottonera and Valletta.

Some French knights refused to fight against their fellow countrymen, with the best-known case being the refusal of the Treasury Secretary, Bosredon de Ransijat, who, as soon as the first French landings began, wrote to Grand Master Hompesch saying that he “did not contract any other military obligation beyond that of warring against the Turks” and he “could never contemplate fighting against my native country.” He declared he was going to “observe the strictest neutrality” throughout the fighting. Naturally, he was arrested and detained at Fort St Angelo.

Sunday, June 10: A meeting convened at the Valletta Banca Giuratale by a number of Maltese to discuss the situation included the most prominent people of Valletta: jurats, members of the judiciary, professionals and members of the nobility. After a lot of empty rhetoric, about 30 people agreed to petition the Grand Master to ask for an armistice. Not all those present, such as Judge Giuseppe Borg Olivier (1753-1831), agreed with the petition.

Four representatives presented the petition to Hompesch where it was read out by Giuseppe Guido in the name of the other three deputies: baron Mario Testaferrata, advocate and court counsellor Francesco Bonanno and advocate Francesco Torreggiani. Diplomatically, Hompesch answered that the petition would be considered but the answer was not forthcoming before considerable time had elapsed.

Monday, June 11: At approximately 3am, the French attacked Porte des Bombes and the Maltese saw their own commander, Knight François d’Aulelart, actually betraying them through lantern signals. He was summarily killed and the French attack was repulsed after two hours. But this betrayal fanned the lack of confidence of the Maltese in their leaders.

At the Cottonera, lack of proper preparations and military training resulted in confusion and endless suspicions, some unfounded. Two knights were killed and others managed to escape the same fate. However, many Maltese began to abandon their posts and went home, with the commandant of Senglea, de Suffren, having to report what was happening to the Grand Master at Valletta.

At Valletta, the Maltese killed some knights suspected of betrayal, though a number of them were innocent. Confusion reigned everywhere, and French collaborators set off a cry for the need of an immediate capitulation. The disorder and indiscipline increased so much that Hompesch and the Council were seriously apprehensive there would be a general insurrection against the Order. Therefore, at daybreak, it was decided to request an armistice.

Maybe this decision was taken so quickly because Hompesch was not a man of action and lacked true military fibre, since he was really a diplomat. As a result, he was at a loss on how to react in the confused and bloody circumstances he found himself in. The armistice was quickly followed by the Order’s capitulation on June 12.

 

Joseph F. Grima is the author of Malta u Franza 1798-1800, Malta, 2006.