Returning to the account in Haris A. Kalligas’s book Monemvasia: A Byzantine City State, there is a detail that cannot be left unnoticed: that Jean de Valette had bestowed upon Antonio da Ravenna a pension of 300 scudi a year. The bulla mentioned by Kalligas indeed exists: it is still conserved in the National Library archives. It is written in Latin and states:

Mathurin d’Aux de Lescout, called Mathurin Romegas.

“Fra Jean de Valletta and the Convent, to our beloved in Christ, Master Antonio Malvasia nicknamed of Ravenna, health in our Everlasting God. Our Order is accustomed to show gratitude and thanks for those who are of service, strive, try or attempt or use their power to favour or help us.  As the work is undertaken and a life fervently spends and for similar great examples entice and inspire and are able on their own to repay.

“The Eperian city, popularly called Malvasia in the Peloponnese, impregnable as it is naturally defended and placed in the territory of the Turkish tyrant, an enemy of our faith. Had been occupied for several years by us and other Christian powers. And you are gifted with good knowledge of the city and surroundings have likeable in this much joined together move and stopped with whom worked this many months before draw by this easy opening.

Piali Pasha. Photo: Wikipedia

“Also, go for the cause here landing affair whole our care share, so naturally placed and the limit was easy and little hand take to be able to open and to this work so much holy and approach attack readily inspire, we encourage with three vessels to join the other five of their Catholic Majesties.

“Weapons soldiers and other things necessary for the campaign be prepared at once and at our command advance and set sail. It is our intention that that for such work, danger, inconvenience and toil that you will undertake as far as this undergo and to you as the first one for this bravery we set forth to remunerate and compensate mature and deliberate counsel of our certain knowledge, to you in event and case that the city and place is taken and is placed under the domain of Our Order, we promise to establish and determine that an annual pension of 300 scudi is given to you for the rest of your life, and after your demise the said pension would be given to your wife and your five legitimate male sons, to be disposed of and divided equally between them and to be given in two payments yearly.

“Wherefore the venerable Our Grand Commander, Procurator and conventual conservator inscribe the said arrears for present and future commitments and orders as in the case of the outcome without argument about your pension of 300 scudi and after your death to your wife and five sons in the rate of two payments as ordered.

“Given in Malta,  September 7, 1564.”

Through the bulla we come to know that the Grand Master was not only taking the matter seriously but that his mind was set on it. Eight vessels were involved, three belonging to the Order and five others to their “Catholic majesties”, presumably the Spanish Crown. This reinforces the strategic value of the rock, for even Spain had been persuaded to join the enterprise and the Spanish Crown was very calculating and shy from taking risks.

What is more, it is not clear whether the 300 scudi a year were to be received by Antonio with immediate effect or subject to a successful outcome of the exploit. However, we come to learn from Kalligas that notwithstanding the failure of the mission, de Valette must have been dismayed when he came to know that the old Antonio had probably been left to his own on the rock.

Mustapha Pasha. Painting by Ray Agius

On the same day of the entry of the bulla of Antonio de Ravenna, immediately beneath it, there was another one relating to Romegas. For some reason, this time it is recorded in old Italian, and states:

“Sia noto e manifesto qualmente mandiamo l’essibitor d’esse il religioso e cavaliero nostro fra Marthurino de lescut dit Romegas, Commendatore de Puysubran et Bordelles del nostro Priorato di Tholosa, con due galere, una galeotta e tre fregate armate nelle parti de levante a far la guerra contra infideki conforme alla nostra professione. Al qual anchora habbiamo comandatoche modo veruno non dubbia offender ne damnificar Christani di qual si voglia principe e in particolar di sua Catholica maesta e Illustrissimo Domino di Venetia ne manco molestar vascelli d’esso illustrissimo Domino anchora che fossero caricati di robba di contrabando ne quel si voglia vascello etiandio de nemici, nelli porti o golfo d’esso dominio. Per tanto preghiamo voi prenominati Massime Illustrissimi Signiori principi, duci, conti baroni governatori, armiragli, provenditori, capitani, patroni e altri officiali di qualsi voglia conditione nella cui terre, porti et giurisditioni capitaranno detto cavalliero o quel si voglia di dette galere galeota, fregate egente ch’ a nostra contemplatione li facciate prestar ogni aggiuto opportuno et ragionevole favor non permettendo si in modo alcuno molestato ne ritardato accio possa complir senza impaccio, e presto suo viaggio ch’oltra le ss vv farano cosa degna di loro e opera pia essendo questo per grande beneficcio da Christiani e a Sua Catholica Maesta e di questi paesi lo riceveremo in singolar beneficcio e piacere offerendoci ad similie e multo maiora in cuius rei bulla nostramagistralis in cera nigra ut datum melite die vii mensis septembris mdxiiii.”

Was it the final provocative act by the Order that constrained Suleiman to decide on the military campaign to take Malta?

Monemvasia is not mentioned in the Romegas bulla, however, there are revealing details that go to show that it may have had to do with it. To start with, it was entered on the same day and immediately beneath the bulla of Antonio da Ravenna. The description of the fleet in the Romegas bulla unmistakeably tallies with that of Francesco Balbi Di Corregio’s The Siege of Malta 1565. As the latter states, the Grand Master “did not let the matter rest, but immediately sent off two galleys, a galeot and three frigates”. The bulla in question also states that the Grand Master put at the disposal of Romegas “due galere, una galeotta e tre fregate armate”.

It coincides with the months of September and October of 1564. Both bullae were entered on September 7, 1564.

In his essay, The Great Siege of Malta published in the online historical magazine History Today in 2007, Tony Rothman states that “In September 1564, de Valette sent a small force led by Romegas to scale the rock at night and seize the garrison above. The plan misfired: Romegas’s men failed to find the path to the summit, and when news of the expedition reached Suleiman, it only increased his determination to eradicate the Knights.”

Roxana, wife of Suleiman. Photo: Wikipedia

Coinciding with the timing of the expedition, Kalligas states that on September 20, 1564, the fleet reached the port of Porto Della Botte to the north of Menomvasia and returned to Malta on October 20, 1564. The time span of the whole affair seems to fit the dates and facts of both bullae. This means that Rothman may have been right. Romegas, after all, was in the expeditionary force.

On the other hand, it may not be excluded that Parisotto, de Valette’s nephew, was also there, though he would have been mentioned at least in one of the bullae.

But was the Monemvasia affair the straw that broke camel’s back? Was it the final provocative act by the Order that constrained Suleiman to decide on the military campaign to take Malta?

In October 1564, news of massive military preparations in Istanbul was already reaching the Order. In his The Knights of Malta, Joseph Attard writes: “It was not long after October 1564 that Jean de Valette was informed of the hectic preparations that were being made for war by the Ottoman Turks. The feverish activity in the enemy’s shipyards and arsenals could not be concealed, and he concluded beyond any shadow of doubt that a seaborne invasion was being prepared for Malta.”

In The Papacy and the Levant 1204-1571, Kenneth Meyer Setton writes: “Antoine Petromol kept sending reports from Istanbul of Sultan Suleiman’s mobilisation of naval forces. On  December 28, 1564, he wrote to Arnaud du Ferrier in Venice “que de jour en jour lesdicts preparatif augmentent”. This would be the greatest arme’e de mer the Sultan had ever put together. From the Bosporus alone, 150 galleys would set sail in the spring of 1565. Dragut Reis and the ‘king’ of Algiers would add at least another 50 galleys and corsairs’ fustas... Piali Pasha was the grand admiral of the sea, Mustafa Pasha would command the land forces which would be set ashore. The army would number at least 50,000 men.”

Suleiman the Magnificent. Photo: Wikipedia

The description of the military preparations in Istanbul leave no doubt that it was all about the invasion of Malta. It is significant that all this was happening in December 1564, only a few months after a number of provocations by Maltese corsairs. The debacle of Monemvasia was one of the last, if not the last, in this string of events.

In autumn 1564, the Divan was divided on whether Malta should be attacked. But as Ernle Bradford states in The Shield and the Sword, it seems that Turgut, Roxanne and Mirimah gained the upper hand, with the final edict of Suleiman stating that: “Those sons of Satan shall, for their continual piracy and insolence, be forever crushed and destroyed.”

The military campaigns of Djerba, Monemvasia and, later on, Malta showed that islands are indeed slippery and perilous things. De Valette thought it to be an easy task to take Monemvasia, following Antonio da Ravenna’s advice that it was there to take. Suleiman had similar thoughts about Malta.

He failed, however, to factor in a number of tactical considerations, including, among others, climatic and topographical disadvantages, scarcity of natural resources, the most important being clean and potable water free from contamination by the enemy, an unfriendly population fervently set to defend its religious faith, the deviousness of the knights, who had no qualms to inflict ­‒ in all ways possible ‒ the maximum of damage on their enemy, and of course, the sure and eventual support of Spain, as the Gran Soccorso would finally demonstrate.

To top it all, discord and altercation evolved between Piali Pasha, commander of the Ottoman fleet, and Mustapha Pasha, commander of the land forces, from the very moment they set foot in Malta. As history has proved, envy between generals over time is the snake that lays the eggs of sure defeat.

Furthermore, impatience weighed heavily upon these generals. Their restlessness and relative inexperience in the art of war led them not to wait for the arrival of the more down to earth and seasoned Turgut Reis, alias Dragut, who would have surely given them sound advice not to take the fatal decision of letting the games begin by first attacking fort St Elmo.

The overthrow of this fort came at great loss of Ottoman life and depletion of precious resources, which would have been put to better use later on in the siege. It turned out to be a pyrrhic victory which the Ottomans would later come to regret.

Concluded. The first part of this article was published last Sunday.

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Jeremy Debono from the National Library for the immeasurable help he gave me to discover the bullae and to get them translated. Thanks also to my friend Dr Guido Pace Spadaro, who, being well versed in Latin, helped me to understand what was in the bulla. Lastly, my thanks go to Justice Grazio Mercieca, who was intrigued as much as I was by the Monemvasia affair. He was kind enough to accompany me throughout the whole voyage to Monemvasia, and let me drive from Athens to the rock and back, not knowing that he was risking his life. Thankfully, during the voyage we only lost a mobile and a wheel.