Paradox. Contradiction. Horns of a dilemma. Catch-22. Take your pick. You’ll need one of those terms to describe one of the main constraints of Robert Abela’s avowed reformist agenda. The more he accomplishes, the more political problems he risks creating for himself.
Abela has had an excellent start to his premiership – in the circumstances. Many people, including some who would never vote for him, are relieved at the signals he’s sent since becoming Prime Minister. He shows he grasps the scale of Malta’s international reputational problem. To address it, he’s ready even to invite some backlash from segments of Labour’s core vote.
His Cabinet appointments have been deft, with problematic ministers left out or moved sideways. Justyne Caruana was pushed out immediately, rather than wait for the drip-drip of further revelations concerning her husband, Silvio Valletta.
It’s true that Abela has retained Edward Scicluna as finance minister. Scicluna is the only minister still standing who’s vulnerable to the findings of a magisterial inquiry into the VGH hospital privatisation deal. In retaining him, though, Abela declared his adherence to a principle: since anyone can request an inquiry into any minister’s behaviour, even on prima facie evidence, then a minister need not resign just because an inquiry is under way.
Otherwise, political adversaries could force the resignation of the entire Cabinet, one by one.
In short, Abela accepts the commonsense reading of the inquiry law. The level of evidence needed to trigger an inquiry, even at the request of civil society, is far less than Scicluna himself demanded. Abela has implicitly rejected Scicluna’s own previous arguments against the mere holding of an inquiry – of cabinet responsibility, of insufficient proof, etc. If Abela’s consistent, no minister will reject a future request for an inquiry on those spurious grounds.
Here is no cosmetic change. It is a fundamental change in the attitude of government towards civil society’s rights at law. It is to Abela’s credit. It will add authority and credibility to his claim to want to strengthen rule of law.
But it does introduce a catch-22. The more deft and decisive Abela is in insisting on ministerial accountability, the more it will be evident how hollow Joseph Muscat’s government was in pooh-poohing such claims as partisan. Yet those same ministers (largely) now work for Abela.
Since there isno alternative government in sight, Labour’s problems are the country’s
Several are at risk of seeing their sins of commission or complicity, under Muscat, being called out under Abela.
The more Abela establishes ethical boundaries, the more he risks spurring calls for his own ministers and political appointments to be called to account. If he refuses to take action, his own authority and credibility are undermined.
If he does take action, he risks serious backlash from hisown supporters.
There’s more. The more Abela accomplishes, the more he risks undermining Muscat as well as some of his own ministers.
Muscat spent three years refusing to sack Konrad Mizzi and Keith Schembri saying they were essential doers in his government. The more Abela achieves, the more hollow that claim will sound.
And the more it will be reasonable to suspect that Muscat was defending them for some other reason.
The more Muscat’s reputation nosedives, the greater the turbulence one should expect in a Labour Party that increasingly realises how much it was duped in the preceding years. That will create unnecessary difficulties for the new Labour leader.
The more Abela accomplishes, the more his stock as prime minister goes up; but his accomplishments will damage Labour’s claims to past achievements.
Take another example: his Cabinet Committee for governance. It includes Edward Zammit Lewis, known to be close to Muscat, and Owen Bonnici, Zammit Lewis’ predecessor as justice minister.
The critics say that little can be expected of such a committee given its members’ past performance.
My own view is that the committee’s composition shows Abela’s seriousness in seeing it act fast on the recommendations of the Venice Commission and the Group of States Against Corruption. Zammit Lewis is responsible for governance; Bonnici has institutional memory. Including both shortens the learning curve and the action plan.
But what if the committee is successful? The reforms will be welcome but, paradoxically, the men who proposed them risk being mocked for having dragged their feet, and hemmed and hawed, under a different leader.
These are paradoxes faced by reformers who have to clear up their own party’s mess.
Their accomplishments risk showing up their colleagues as previously spineless, sightless or ruthless.
Their reforms pave the way for (legitimate) demands for more.
It also means that their reforms risk triggering a backlash from within – from people suffering from the pressure, or feeling it’s unfair that past behaviour is judged by new criteria, or people so used to a strongman’s power that they think of separation of powers as foolish concessions.
For anyone tempted to feel satisfaction at these dilemmas, think again.
It’s these dilemmas that could end up undermining the re-forms Malta needs. Either by persuading Abela to keep clear of meaningful reforms or, if he does decide to embark on them, by losing support within his own party.
Abela’s dilemmas are not just his or Labour’s. Since there isno alternative government in sight, Labour’s problems are the country’s.