The Royal Air Force Vulcan bomber crash in Zabbar 30 years ago, when five crew members and a woman resident died, was an avoidable accident, according to official British government records.
The 30th anniversary of the tragic event was commemorated in Zabbar last Friday. It results that the accident was sparked off by a bad landing at Luqa airport at the end of a flight from RAF Waddington.
The only civilian casualty, Vincenza Zammit, 48, was in the town's main road when she was hit by a falling chunk of the aircraft.
The crash caused devastation in Zabbar and many still consider it to be a miracle that casualties were so low.
Surfing the internet, I came across official records kept at the National Archives at Kew, in the UK, relating to the crash.
Details of the crash and how various chunks of the huge Delta-winged plane fell in various parts of the town have often been recalled and, therefore, I will concentrate on relevant parts in the records at Kew.
In its conclusion, the report notes that "unfortunately, it is not possible to see this other than as an avoidable accident in which a serviceable aircraft was flown into the ground killing all rear crew members".
Summing up, the board of inquiry remarked that it was not prudent to allow the co-pilot to do the first approach at Luqa; the captain had given an inadequate briefing to the co-pilot on the problems of landing on a short runway, especially one with a slope; the first approach had been made more problematic for the co-pilot by the requirement to change the glide slope angle from breakoff height and the restriction on using the brake 'chute.
The captain's recognition of the high rate of descent had been too late on the approach to allow a recovery and his action on recovery had probably increased the force on the undercarriage. The captain was found to have been negligent in his handling of the aircraft.
The pilot, Flight Lieutenant G.R. Alcock. and the co-pilot, Flying Officer E.G. Alexander escaped with their lives after ejecting from the aircraft moments before it crashed.
I was at Luqa airport on a coverage with a photographer when the Vulcan landed and then took off immediately. I could not believe my eyes when moments later I saw a cloud of black smoke and burning objects falling from the sky.
It was not immediately clear from Luqa where the aircraft had fallen but I got the feeling it was a populated area to the south of the island. I recall we drove in that direction until we came across fire engines rushing to Zabbar and we followed them to find scenes of devastation in Sanctuary Street and other parts of the town.
According to records, the proper co-pilot was not able to take part in the planned Malta "ranger" as his wife was about to have a baby and so the crew was reconstituted with a another co-pilot.
The report points out that: "As you approach runway 24 there is a large Nimrod hangar to the right of the threshold, this can produce disturbing winds at the final point of the approach... In 1975, the runway at Luqa was a 'short' runway of some 7,800 feet, and also narrower than the runway at Waddington.
"This causes a little visual confusion for the pilot on final approach as the runway aspect is different to that he is used to with a normal length runway; it can cause you to believe that you are higher than you actually are.
"Also, the runway, and the undershoot to the runway, slope upwards, which again can cause a pilot to go lower on the final approach than normal," the report states.
The board of inquiry criticised the captain for his decision to allow the co-pilot to make the first approach. They did not think this was "prudent". They also felt he gave an inadequate briefing to the co-pilot on the issues involved in landing on a short runway and the slope of the ground.
Investigators felt that these aspects and the decision not to allow the chute to be "streamed" all put undue pressure on the co-pilot for this first approach with a captain he was not familiar with.
The board felt that the evidence from the two pilots in regard to heights at which actions were taken during the descent was at variance and unreliable.
The co-pilot, in the latter phase of the descent, selected high-drag airbrake but was then, in the opinion of the board, late in applying power to correct the increased rate of descent which would have resulted from the airbrake selection.
It was their view that he had maintained aircraft speed by changing aircraft attitude rather than by the selection of increased engine power.
Late in the descent, the captain had noticed from the rate of climb and descent indicator that they did indeed have an excessive rate of descent and took control. He took the engines to 100 per cent and pushed forward on the control column; all of these effectively at the same time.
The co-pilot believed this happened at between 100 - 150 feet, not 350 feet as the captain claimed.
The board went into considerable analysis of a series of four photos taken by Godfrey Mangion, an aircraft and photo enthusiast, showing the bomber - XM645 - very close to the runway threshold.
From these photos and the way they show the changing aircraft attitude and control surface positions, the board determined that the power up and nose down commanded by the captain took place about 1.3 seconds before impact, at a height of only some 20 feet.
The aircraft hit the undershoot with sufficient force to sheer off the undercarriage, the aircraft bounced back into the air some 20 feet or so, it then hit the runway again some 600 feet after the impact before climbing away again with the captain attempting to do a circuit and land.
Fire broke out on the starboard wing as a consequence. The report gives an account by Mr Mangion who had also photographed the aircraft explosion over Zabbar.
"... the aircraft made a rough contact with the runway, so rough that the right undercarriage did not withstand the aircraft's weight and departed the aircraft. The aircraft slid on its belly for some time damaging its undersides, at this very time I heard the roar of the aircraft's four Olympus jet engines, which, however, meant that the pilot decided to take off again. Indeed he did, also leaving his port undercarriage on the runway," Mr Mangion recalled.
Aviation expert Richard J. Caruana wrote in an article for a book published by the Zabbar local council that Flt Lt Alcock had been involved in another Vulcan accident four years earlier over Tyneside but then he had taken the aircraft up to 10,000 feet to give his crew time to bale out also preventing the aircraft from crashing on a village school.