On March 30, 1282, Easter Monday, during vespers at the church of the Holy Spirit on the outskirts of Palermo, Sicily, incidents between the Angevin (French) soldiery and the Sicilians led to an uprising and the death of a number of the French.
There are various suggestions as to the events that led to this rebellion, among which was the story that a French sergeant, Drouet, pestered a married woman whose husband killed him.
Another story holds that the people of Palermo had a festival outside the city and the French soldiers, on the pretext of checking for hidden weapons, began to fondle the breasts of the Sicilian women, leading to a riot in which the French were killed.
Whatever the immediate cause may have actually been, the fact is that, within six weeks, all the French inhabitants of Sicily were massacred in what has remained known as ‘The Sicilian Vespers’, after which full-scale warfare ensued.
The vespers incident was only the spark that led to outright war between Peter III of Aragon (1240-85) and Charles of Anjou (c.1226/7-85), ruler of Southern Italy and Sicily. With the approval of Pope Clement IV, who opposed the German House of Hohenstaufen, Charles had ousted the Germans from their Italian lands, with the German leaders, Manfred and Conradin, both being killed in the battles of Benevento (1266) and Tagliacozzo (1268) or their aftermath.
Peter of Aragon was married to Manfred’s daughter, Constance, which made him the heir of the Hohenstaufen claims in right of his wife. After the vespers of March 30, a Sicilian embassy asked Peter to oust Charles and take over his throne, which he accepted to carry out.
Peter landed with an army at Trapani, Sicily, and, by October 1282, the remaining French forces in Sicily had been expelled.
In the autumn of 1282, a general insurrection by the Maltese, helped by an Aragonese military force – led by Manfred de Lancia and Corrado Lancia – meant that Malta declared for Peter. But the Angevins held firm in Grand Harbour’s Castrum Maris (Castle by the Sea) on the site of modern Fort St Angelo.
Malta was coveted by both Peter and Charles because the island had strategic and commercial importance, with both realms wanting to expand their empires and influence in the Mediterranean. The best contemporary accounts of this period are by the Catalan mercenary and chronicler Ramon Montaner (1265-1336) and the chronicler (also a Catalan) Bernat Desclot (?-c.1288), though one must make due allowance for bias and, sometimes, exaggerations. For an unbiased account, the reader is referred to medievalist historian Charles Dalli’s 2006 researched publication Malta the Medieval Millenium.
To regain control over Sicily, Charles had to control Malta, but he had to replenish his fleet and forces that had been badly mauled in the evacuation of Messina and the naval battle of Nicotera fought on October 11, 1282. The reconstituted Angevin fleet was placed under the command of Guillaume Cornut and Bartholome Bonvin.
Meanwhile, King Peter had departed from Sicily but left a sizable Aragonese fleet, under the command of the Calabrian knight Roger de Lauria (c.1245-1305), which proceeded to raid the Calabrian coast. Lauria’s aim was to intercept the Angevin fleet which, however, managed to arrive at Malta first and relieved the besieged garrison of the Castrum Maris. The besiegers had to lift the siege and retired to Mdina.
After a short rest at Scicli in preparation for the coming conflict, the Aragonese forces arrived at Malta. A daring reconnaissance by a galley that entered the harbour with muffled oars, together with information by Aragonese scouts on land, gave Lauria the information he needed about the dispositions of the Angevin fleet.
The two fleets were evenly matched in number, each having over 20 galleys each, but the French had about 7,500 men on board compared to the 5,500 Aragonese. The Angevins had superior heavy infantry but the Aragonese had elite almogavars (Catalan light quick-moving infantry) and crossbowmen who ultimately decided the battle. However, both sides relied mainly on their crossbowmen.
Initially, the Angevins erroneously thought that the Aragonese fleet was only about 12 galleys strong. Although actually almost equal in number, the Aragonese galleys had a superior design, with higher than average forecastles that afforded the crews better protection from the bolts fired by Angevin crossbows.
The Aragonese galleys had a superior design, with higher than average forecastles that afforded the crews better protection from the bolts fired by Angevin crossbows
The Aragonese tactics, based on Genoese usage, were superior. Their galleys were connected together with heavy chains but kept apart enough to allow the deployment of their oars. The galleys moved forward as a unit and prevented the Angevins from getting between them, at the same time showering the French with deadly bolts from the crossbows fired from their higher forecastles.
According to The Cambridge Medieval History (Volume VI), the battle – also known as The Battle of Malta – took place on July 8, 1283. Lauria manoeuvred his fleet into Grand Harbour while the Angevins set sail to prevent being blockaded. Fighting started at about daybreak, and the French, unable to manoeuvre in between their opposing galleys, kept up such continuous fire that they ran out of ammunition by midday.
Lauria ordered his fleet to advance and raked the Angevin galleys with javelins and crossbow bolts, thus wreaking havoc among the French crews. Boarding followed, and the Aragonese captured 10 galleys, though another seven under Bovin (Cornut had been killed in single combat by Lauria, according to Muntaner) managed to escape from the harbour.
The battle ended at dusk, leaving the Aragonese complete masters of the ‘field’. Montaner wrote that the French lost 3,500 men (a seemingly exaggerated figure) and 860 were captured, while the Aragonese dead numbered 300, with a further 200 wounded. Desclot states that only 860 Provençal (French) soldiers escaped with their lives, another apparent exaggeration, though he may have been referring to the number of prisoners taken.
But the Angevins still held out at the Castrum Maris which could not be attacked properly because of a lack of catapults and other siege equipment such as trebuchets. After two days’ rest, for unknown reasons because the city had accepted Peter way back in the autumn of 1282, Lauria advanced on Mdina where he received the homage of the city and 1,000 uncie in gifts (‘protection money’, it has been suggested) and left 200 men to continue besieging the Castrum Maris.
Lauria then attacked Gozo, which surrendered immediately and where he was given jewels to the value of 500 uncie and provisions for the fleet. A hundred Catalan soldiers were left at Gozo to garrison the island’s castle. Lauria’s aggressive actions are hard to fathom out, bearing in mind that both Catalan chroniclers state clearly that the local populations had cooperated with the Aragonese.
Apart from ensuring that the Maltese islands became part of the Aragonese empire, the battle at Malta’s Grand Harbour forced the Angevins to postpone their planned invasion of Sicily and was the forerunner of the Battle of the Gulf of Naples, which took place on June 5, 1284.
Lauria’s tactical superiority again won the day but Angevin power was not badly dented and remained a force to be reckoned with. Both Peter of Aragon and Charles of Anjou passed away in 1285 but the struggle was to continue for many decades to come.
A peace agreement was signed at Caltabellotta in 1302 but the struggle was resumed 10 years later, and another agreement was only signed in 1372. The division between Naples/Southern Italy and Sicily endured till 1442 but was brought to an end in 1442 when King Alfonso VI conquered Naples.
Joseph F. Grima is a retired casual history lecturer and assistant director of Education