Napoleon: ‘Malta or War’ 

by Victor Aquilina

Published by Kite

More than 200 years after the French invasion of Malta, Napoleon Bonaparte still stirs endless discussion. In a book just published by Kite, Napoleon: ‘Malta or War’, Victor Aquilina unravels a chain of fast-moving events that pushed Malta into the eye of a storm that led to the resumption of war between Britain and France in 1803, kicking off the Napoleonic Wars.    

It is hard to believe it was over Malta that Britain and France had gone to war again in 1803 after a peace deal that lasted only 14 months. Britain had fallen out with Napoleon over a number of key issues, particularly over his disruption of the balance of power in Europe and his territorial ambitions over Egypt. However, it was ultimately Britain’s refusal to give up Malta that tipped the scales for war.  

When differences between the two powers simmered to boiling point, Napoleon blurted out: “Malta or war.” Britain picked up the challenge and the peace deal, the Treaty of Amiens, was thrown into the dustbin of history. But how did Malta come to be pushed into the eye of the storm? Why did Britain hold its ground, and why did Bonaparte concentrate on Malta so much when he was conquering Europe?  

Author Victor Aquilina

In Napoleon: ‘Malta or War’, Aquilina gives an in-depth account of the negotiations that led to the Treaty of Amiens and of the interminable twists and turns in the arguments over Malta’s possession.

He explores Britain’s shift in policy over Malta and the Mediterranean, Russia’s part in the interplay of diplomatic manoeuvres, and brings to life the contributions of the leading actors in the fast-moving events that led to the Napoleonic Wars and Napoleon’s downfall. 

To Bonaparte, the loss of Malta, which he called the strongest place in Europe and his darling conquest when he invaded it in 1798 on his way to Egypt, had been too much to take.

He reckoned that, if Britain were to keep the island for good, it would wipe out his hope of ever using it again as a stepping stone for yet another attempt at invading Egypt. He had in mind taking Sicily too, but he first wanted to hit Britain by blocking the overland route to India. He was, therefore, absolutely determined not to allow Britain keep Malta, not when his troops had been kicked out of the island just two years after he had won it so easily. 

Bonaparte had a grand design in mind: using Egypt, Malta, the Ionian Islands and Sicily as building blocks, as it were, of what he called his “principal dream to become master of the Mediterranean”. But Britain, now by far the superior maritime power, was determined not to give Bonaparte the slightest chance of taking the lead in the Mediterranean. 

As European countries watched Britain and France inch closer to war again, Malta was tossed about as a prized possession, not to be given away at any price

As European countries watched Britain and France inch closer to war again, Malta was tossed about as a prized possession, not to be given away at any price. In the wider European canvas that Bonaparte was now drawing with unbridled effrontery and zeal through his military conquests and setting up of sister republics, Malta may have been considered the most unlikely place over which the two powers would spar with so much conviction and determination. Yet, that is exactly what they did as both held their ground, pushing the island right into the eye of the storm.  

Britain’s side of the story is well brought out in the parliamentary debates, in the flurry of diplomatic despatches and, more directly, in the negotiations in London, Amiens and Paris. These give a first-hand account of how Britain looked at Malta in the very first years of its long association with the island. However, Bonaparte’s obsession with Malta in the Paris talks over the implementation of the peace accord is equally, if not more, interesting as in one declaration or outburst after another he invariably makes references to the island in a manner that leaves no doubt of his resolute determination to deny it to Britain.  

Thousands of books have been written about Napoleon, but only a small number deal specifically and at some length with the Treaty of Amiens. What went on in the negotiations in London, Amiens and Paris and in the interplay of diplomatic manoeuvres, is quite intriguing and merits more than a passing reference in the history of that turbulent period. Is it true, for instance, that Bonaparte had once suggested the blowing up of the island’s fortifications or that he even had a territory or two in mind which he would have been prepared to barter for Malta? 

Even more intriguing perhaps are the attempts made to bribe members of Bonaparte’s family in a bid to persuade him to change his mind and agree to let Britain keep Malta for good. Who were the people behind the move and did Bonaparte know of the attempts made behind his back?  What was the real value of the gold, silver and gems he plundered from Malta to finance his expedition to Egypt?  

When Bonaparte won Malta, he called it the strongest place in Europe, but when he lost it, the island was just a ‘miserable rock’ to him, not worth going to war for. Yet, in the howling winds of St Helena, where he spent the rest of his life in exile after his downfall, he told his aides that he would have preferred having been exiled in Malta.  

The book has a foreword by historian Joe M. Pirotta.  

The article is based on extracts from the introduction to the book. Victor Aquilina is a former editor of Times of Malta and author of a number of other books.